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Abstract
This dissertation consists of four essays that contribute to the literature on
international trade and labour markets. The first essay studies the inter-
action between economic integration, product and process innovation, and
relative skill demand in a model of international oligopoly. As trade bar-
riers are dismantled foreign competition intensifies. Competing enterprises
respond by investing more aggressively in both product and process innova-
tion. The relative demand for unskilled workers decreases as a result. The
second essay studies labour market outcomes in a model of intra-industry
trade between a rigid-wage Europe and a flexible-wage America. Firms can
choose to serve the foreign market either through exports or through local
subsidiaries. The essay demonstrates that the adverse employment effects of
a unilateral wage floor increase significantly when trade barriers are removed.
Multinational firms mitigate the adverse employment effects of one-sided
wage rigidity. The third essay analyses how different unionisation structures
affect firm productivity and firm performance in a monopolistic competition
model with heterogeneous firms and free entry. While centralised bargain-
ing induces tougher selection among heterogeneous producers and increases
average productivity and profit levels, firm-level bargaining allows less pro-
ductive entrants to remain in the market. The positive effect of centralised
bargaining on average productivity can, however, be overturned when firms
face international low-wage competition. Finally, the fourth chapter analyses
empirically the effect of offshoring on workers’ labour market transitions in
Germany. The results suggest that the effects of offshoring are strongly age-
and skill-specific and also vary between sectors. While offshoring does not
affect overall job stability in the manufacturing sector, it is associated with
an increase in overall job stability in the service sector.
Keywords:
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Zusammenfassung
Die vorliegende Dissertation besteht aus vier Aufsätzen, die sich mit Fra-
gen des Außenhandels und der Arbeitsmarktökonomie auseinandersetzen.
Der erste Aufsatz untersucht in einem internationalen Oligopol die Inter-
aktion zwischen Handelsliberalisierung, Produkt- und Prozessinnovationen
und der relativen Nachfrage nach niedrig qualifizierten Arbeitnehmern. Der
Abbau von Handelsschranken führt zu einer Verschärfung des Wettbewerbs,
auf die die konkurrierenden Firmen reagieren, indem sie ihre Investitionen in
Produkt- und Prozessinnovationen ausweiten. Infolgedessen sinkt die Nach-
frage nach niedrig qualifizierten Arbeitnehmern. Der zweite Aufsatz analy-
siert die Wirkung eines einseitigen Mindestlohnes in einem Zwei-Länder-
Modell, in dem Firmen den ausländischen Markt entweder durch Exporte
oder durch lokale Tochterfirmen bedienen. Eine Liberalisierung des Handels
erhöht die negativen Beschäftigungseffekte von Mindestlöhnen. Dagegen be-
grenzt die Existenz von multinationalen Unternehmen den durch Mindest-
löhne verursachten Arbeitsplatzabbau. Der dritte Aufsatz untersucht, wie
sich kollektive Tarifverhandlungen bei freiem Marktzutritt auf die Produk-
tivität und den wirtschaftlichen Erfolg von heterogenen Firmen auswirken.
Zentrale Lohnverhandlungen verschärfen den Auswahlprozess und erhöhen
die durchschnittliche Produktivität und den Gewinn überlebender Firmen.
Stattdessen begünstigen dezentrale Tarifverhandlungen weniger produktive
Firmen. Sind die Firmen internationalem Wettbewerb ausgesetzt, so können
auch zentrale Tarifverhandlungen die Produktivität reduzieren. Der vierte
Beitrag untersucht empirisch die Auswirkungen von Offshoring auf Arbei-
terflüsse in Deutschland. Während Offshoring die Stabilität von Beschäfti-
gungsverhältnissen in der verarbeitenden Industrie nicht beeinflusst, geht es
einher mit einer Zunahme der Beschäftigungsstabilität im Dienstleistungs-
sektor. Die Effekte von Offshoring hängen ferner stark vom Alter und der
Bildung des einzelnen Arbeitnehmers ab.
Schlagwörter:
Außenhandel, Arbeitsmärkte, Offshoring, multinationale Firmen,
Arbeiterflüsse, Innovationen, Produktivität, Gewerkschaften, Lohnrigidität
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Chapter 1
Introduction and Overview
1.1 Introduction
Economic globalisation, broadly defined as the process of integrating na-
tional economies into a world economy or a single marketplace, has elevated
the importance of trade for developing and developed economies alike. Over
the past four and a half decades total world trade (exports and imports of
goods and services) as a percentage of global GDP more than doubled from
24 percent in 1960 to almost 57 percent in 2006 (World Bank, 2009). While
Germany remained the world’s biggest exporter in 2007, with China a coun-
try comes second that was virtually isolated from the world economy until
1978. But not only is international trade growing, its nature has changed as
well. For centuries countries exchanged final goods and raw materials. In
contrast, trade now increasingly involves bits of value being added in many
different locations around the globe. Firms decompose their various stages of
production geographically and set up production sites abroad or subcontract
production processes to foreign suppliers.
The ongoing economic integration of the world economy has sparked sig-
nificant policy debate in developed countries about the associated effects
on labour market outcomes. Recent reforms of labour market institutions
in OECD countries that aimed at increasing labour market flexibility have
been justified by the challenges posed by economic globalisation. Intensified
foreign competition, the rise in offshoring and the occurrence of footloose
multinational enterprises (MNEs) are widely feared to bring down wages,
endanger jobs and increase inequality in Western societies. In an opinion
poll recently released by the German Marshall Fund, 54 percent of the re-
spondents named ‘outsourcing to a foreign country’ as the factor ‘most re-
sponsible for the loss of German jobs’ (German Marshall Fund of the United
1
2States, 2007). Proponents of free trade, in contrast, argue that trade can
actually result in more jobs by expanding export markets and thus the de-
mand for domestic products. They also point to the benefits to consumers,
as materialised in lower prices and greater product variety, and argue that
domestic firms are bound to offer competitive prices and improve production
efficiency when faced with international competition.
My purpose in this thesis is to contribute to our understanding of how the
globalisation process affects labour market outcomes and interacts with na-
tional labour market institutions. More precisely, the following four chapters
of this thesis attempt to answer the following questions:
1. How does economic integration affect the incentives of firms to inno-
vate? What are the subsequent effects on relative labour demand for
the unskilled?
2. How do regulations that add to the rigidity of national labour markets
affect wages and unemployment in a global world economy?
3. What do unions do to productivity, firm performance and consumer
welfare? Do these effects change when firms face international non-
unionised competitors?
4. How does international outsourcing affect labour market dynamics in
Germany? Does the effect differ between sectors, worker groups and
labour market transitions?
My work blends insights from international trade theory and labour eco-
nomics. For a long time, these two fields have evolved independently from
one another. The separation is particularly evident in the debate on glob-
alisation and unemployment. While the effects of international competition
on domestic employment are controversially discussed in the media and are
a source of great anxiety for many citizens, most economists seem to believe
that the employment effects of international trade are negligible. Interna-
tional trade theory has, until recently, largely ignored micro-founded models
of unemployment and relied on long-run general equilibrium models, in which
fully flexible labour markets allow the economy to sustain full employment.1
1There are some early exceptions that considered trade under less than full employment.
Brecher (1974), for instance, has extended the traditional Heckscher-Ohlin theory to allow
for a binding (worldwide) minimum wage. And Magee (1976) has surveyed the effects
of various factor market distortions in traditional trade models. Instead of focusing on
imperfections in the labour market, Mussa (1978) postulated positive adjustment costs
for moving capital from one sector to another and analysed how a (small) open economy
adjusts when relative commodity prices change.
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Trade and trade policy can then, by assumption, neither affect short-run
nor long-run unemployment. Instead, economists have invested a great deal
of effort in analysing the effect of international trade on the distribution of
income.
Most existing studies on the link between global goods markets and na-
tional factor markets are based on one of the two traditional workhorse
models of international trade. The first is the Heckscher-Ohlin, which pre-
dicts that the owners of abundant production factors gain from trade while
the owners of scarce factors lose. The second is the Ricardo-Viner model,
which predicts that opening up to trade harms factors specific to the import-
competing sector, but benefits factors tied to the export sector. Crucially,
both models assume that production factors are fully employed at all times
and therefore leave no room to address many of the issues raised in the public
debate on trade and labour markets. In fact, many economists view interna-
tional trade as a microeconomic sub-discipline that is concerned with the allo-
cation of resources while regarding unemployment as a macroeconomic issue
unrelated to trade and trade policy (Davidson and Matusz, 2004). Krugman
(1993), for instance, has argued that ‘it should be possible to emphasize to
students that the level of employment is a macroeconomic issue (...) depend-
ing in the long run on the natural rate of unemployment, with microeconomic
policies like tariffs having little effect’ (p.25).
Only recently have economists begun to incorporate micro-based models
of unemployment into traditional trade models (see, for instance, Kreick-
emeier and Nelson, 2006; Davidson et al., 2008; Egger and Kreickemeier,
2009). There are at least three good reasons for analysing – not only theo-
retically but also empirically – the interactions between global goods markets
and imperfect factor markets.
First, the labour market consequences of globalisation, and in particular
the effect on domestic jobs, are a source of public anxiety. Economists could
address these concerns – whether justified or not – much more convincingly
if there was a significant body of empirical evidence on the issue, and their
arguments relied on formal models of trade and unemployment. Chapter 3
makes a step in this direction by studying the effects of a one-sided minimum
wage in a two-country model of intra-industry trade with multinational firms.
Second, labour market regulations do not only affect employment but
also other economic variables of interest which are in turn often influenced
by the globalisation process. Trade economists have, for instance, stressed
the productivity-enhancing effect of trade integration (cf. Melitz, 2003; Melitz
and Ottaviano, 2008). At the same time, the effect of unions on productiv-
ity is a classic research topic in labour economics (cf. Metcalf, 2003; Hirsch,
2004, for recent surveys). But it is very difficult to know a priori how the
4union effect on productivity changes when a country opens up to trade – in
particular when labour market characteristics differ among trading partners.
Chapter 4 studies the interaction between unionisation structures, firm pro-
ductivity, and firm performance in both a closed and in an open economy
model, and detects significant differences between the effects of unionisation
in the two settings.
Third, even the most ardent supporters of free trade acknowledge that
trade liberalisation not only entails welfare gains but also implies adjustment
costs in the short-run. Intensified foreign competition or the rise in offshoring
will almost certainly displace the jobs of some workers (while potentially
securing those of others). The globalisation process thus creates winners
and losers, thereby creating a powerful challenge to the welfare state. To
avoid a new social divide and to stave off protectionism, the state has to
enable a sufficient number of voters to benefit from globalisation. But for
doing so, it is important to identify those groups of the society that bear the
burden of adjustment. Chapter 5 of this thesis investigates empirically how
workers’ labour market transitions are affected by offshoring, and shows that
the effects vary strongly with worker characteristics.
Blending insights from international trade theory and labour economics
can also prove useful in the vigorous debate on wage inequality. Since the
integration of China and other emerging economies into the world economy
has coincided with an increase in wage inequality in the United States and
other developed countries, some writers have linked these two developments.
After all, basic Heckscher-Ohlin theory predicts that the integration of a
low-skilled labour abundant economy with a developed economy abundant
in skilled labour leads to an increase in the relative price of skill in the de-
veloped economy.2 The consensus view, however, suggests that technological
and institutional change rather than international trade have been the ma-
jor causes of increased inequality in advanced countries (see Berman et al.,
1998; Desjonqueres et al., 1999; DiNardo et al., 1996, to name just a few
studies). However, the question of whether trade or technological change has
been behind recent developments in the labour market may be misleading.
In fact, trade can induce technical change. Recent empirical evidence by
Bloom et al. (2008) suggests that Chinese import competition is associated
with a significant increase in the adoption of new technology and the gen-
eration of innovation. Chapter 2 of this thesis contributes to the debate by
2Intuitively, developed and emerging economies, by exchanging goods produced with
different factor (skill) intensities, are effectively trading factors of production. Developed
countries mainly import low-skilled labour intensive goods from emerging economies and
export high-skilled labour intensive goods in return. Trade with emerging economies
therefore increases the effective supply of unskilled labour in developed economies.
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exploring theoretically the interaction between trade liberalisation, product
and process innovation, and the relative demand for unskilled workers.
Globalisation has changed and is still changing the world we are living
in. Harsher international competition and a finer international division of
labour are likely to increase efficiency and benefit consumers through lower
prices and increased product variety. Yet many people view globalisation
with scepticism and fear, with the labour market consequences being a prime
source of anxiety. Since the labour market impinges directly on the well-being
of every individual, it is important for society at large to understand how the
ongoing integration process affects labour market outcomes. But in order to
gain a thorough understanding of the interactions between globalisation and
the labour market, economists have to cross the dichotomy between labour
economics and international trade and combine insights from the two fields.
This thesis makes some headway in this direction.
The rest of this introductory chapter is organised as follows: I first re-
view some empirical facts about the globalisation process. In particular, I
briefly discuss some of the characteristics that distinguish the current wave
of globalisation from earlier periods of economic integration. The main body
of the thesis will refer to these features of the modern world economy. I then
summarise the main contributions and findings of the dissertation.
1.2 The Growth of World Trade: Some Em-
pirical Facts
Trade Volumes. The global economy is not an invention of our times.
In fact, globalisation experienced its first heyday between the end of the
Napoleonic wars and the outbreak of World War I. As shown in Table 1.1,
merchandise exports as a share of GDP grew from 1.0 to 7.9 percent be-
tween 1820 and 1913. The growth in world trade was spurred by two major
innovations in transportation technologies: steamships and railroads. These
transport innovations drastically decreased the cost of moving goods between
(and within) countries. British ocean freight rates, for instance, remained
fairly constant between 1740 and 1840 but dropped by 70 percent between
1840 and 1910 (Harley, 1988). Furthermore, the growth in world trade was
promoted by a reduction in tariffs. Britain abolished the Corn Laws, a tar-
iff on grain introduced after the Napoleonic wars, in 1846. Other countries
followed Britain’s move towards free trade in a series of reciprocal trade
agreements, beginning with the Cobden Chevalier Treaty between Britain
and France in 1860. Even though the trend towards liberalising trade was
6Country 1820 1870 1913 1950 1973 1998
France 1.3 4.9 7.8 7.6 15.2 28.7
Germany na 9.5 16.1 6.2 23.8 38.9
Japan na 0.2 2.4 2.2 7.7 13.4
UK 3.1 12.2 17.5 11.3 14.0 25.0
USA 2.0 2.5 3.7 3.0 4.9 10.1
World 1.0 4.6 7.9 5.5 10.5 17.2
Source: Maddison (1995), Maddison (2001)
na: not available
Table 1.1: Merchandise Exports as a Share of GDP,
1820 - 1998 (in Percent)
reversed after 1879, when the German Chancellor Otto von Bismarck raised
tariffs on agricultural and industrial products, the level of effective protection
remained relatively low in most countries until the eve of World War I (with
the United States being the principal exception).
The first era of globalisation ended badly with World War I, the Great
Depression and World War II. In fact, most countries turned inwards between
1913 and the early post-World War II period. Between 1913 and 1950 mer-
chandise exports as a share of GDP plummeted from 16.1 to 6.2 percent in
Germany and from 17.5 to 11.3 percent in the UK. Overall, in 1950 merchan-
dise exports amounted to just 5.5 percent of global GDP. While world trade
grew considerably in the aftermath of World War II, much of the increase
just represented a recovery to former levels. By 1973, the United Kingdom,
which was a highly trade-dependent economy already during the Victorian
Era, had still not reached its pre-World War I level.
Since the 1970s, however, the growth in world trade truly represents a
new degree of integration. Figure 1.1 provides a detailed overview of how the
degree of trade openness – measured as total exports and imports of goods
and services over GDP – evolved in the US, the UK, and Germany between
1960 and 2007. All three countries witnessed a strong increase in economic
integration but the trend increase was particularly pronounced in Germany
and the US. German trade openness increased by as much as 51.3 percentage
points from 33.4 percent in 1971 to 84.7 in 2006. In the US the share of
exports and imports in GDP has almost tripled since 1960 although the
USA remains considerably less dependent on trade than both Germany and
the UK. Figure 1.1 also documents the steep increase in worldwide exports
and imports since the 1960s. Today the world economy has indeed become
integrated to a degree unprecedented in history, not least because emerging
Chapter 1. Introduction and Overview 7
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Figure 1.1: Exports and Imports as a Share of GDP, 1960 - 2007
economies, and most notably Brazil, China and India, have become more and
more integrated into the global economy. China’s share in world merchandise
exports, for instance, approached 9 percent in 2007 compared to just 2.5
percent 14 years earlier (World Trade Organization, 2008).
While international trade has been an ever increasing part of economic
activity since the 1960s, the outlook for the near future is bleak. The fi-
nancial crisis that began in 2007 and continues to this day has turned into
a trade crisis. In an increasingly interdependent global economy, economic
shocks quickly spill-over national boundaries and a downturn in one country
translates more rapidly to a downturn elsewhere. Consequently, countries
that are heavily dependent on trade are hit particularly hard by the collapse
in global demand. In fact, the World Trade Organization (2009) forecasts
that the volume of world trade will plummet by around 9 percent in 2009,
the largest drop since World War II. In the near future, the looming danger
of trade protectionism could further reduce world trade. The current crisis
thus reminds us of the fact that the globalisation process is not irreversible;
countries can turn inward again – and they tend to do so in time of crisis.
8Intra-Industry Trade It is not only and not even primarily the sheer
volume of trade that distinguishes modern times from the first golden age
of globalisation. Historically, the UK and Northwest Europe were net im-
porters of primary products and net exporters of manufactured goods. In
1913 manufactured goods made up more than three quarters of British ex-
ports, while the share of manufactures in British imports just reached 20.2
percent (Mitchell, 1988). Nowadays, in contrast, trade in goods is dominated
by exports and imports of manufactured products; in 2007 their share was
76.8 percent of total UK exports and 74.2 percent of total imports (Eurostat,
2009). At the same time, primary products accounted for only 18.4 percent
of UK exports and 21.1 percent of UK imports.3 At the beginning of the
20th century Britain mainly traded with overseas producers of raw materials,
whereas today the country predominately trades with other European coun-
tries. In 2007, intra-EU trade accounted for 58.2 percent of British exports
and for 54.7 percent of British imports (Eurostat, 2009). These numbers
are indicative of the rise in intra-industry trade – two-way trade in goods of
the same commodity class that to a large extent takes place between similar
countries.
Intra-industry trade can involve similar, horizontally differentiated prod-
ucts or vertically differentiated products that differ, e.g., in terms of their
quality and price level (cf. Fontagné and Freudenberg, 2002, for a detailed
classification). Horizontal intra-industry trade is generally explained by love-
of-variety preferences and economies of scale in the production of differen-
tiated products (cf. Helpman and Krugman, 1985). Vertical intra-industry
trade, in contrast, can also be driven by cross-country differences, e.g., in the
qualification of the labour force (OECD, 2002; Fontagné and Freudenberg,
2002). The extent of intra-industry trade is particularly high for complex
manufactured goods that are easily differentiated and often require the in-
put of specialized intermediate goods (and are thus more likely to benefit
from economies of scale in production). The OECD (2002) has estimated
that between 1996 and 2000 intra-industry trade accounted for 72 percent
of total German manufacturing trade (see Table 1.2). Likewise, for the UK
and the USA the share of intra-industry trade in total manufacturing trade
was 73.7 and 68.5 percent, respectively.4 In all three countries the relative
3The figures do not sum up to 100 percent since some traded products could not be
classified. Primary products can be further broken down into food and beverages with
a share in exports and imports of 5.3 and 8.4 percent, respectively, energy (10.6 and 9.4
percent) and crude materials (2.5 and 3.2 percent). Eurostat (2009) does not consider
trade in services.
4The extent of intra-industry trade is commonly measured by the Grubel-Lloyd index
(Grubel and Lloyd, 1975). For any particular product class i and a trading partner r, an
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Country 1988-1991 1992-1995 1996-2000
France 75.9 77.6 77.5
Germany 67.1 72.0 72.0
Japan 37.6 40.8 47.6
UK 70.1 73.1 73.7
USA 63.5 65.3 68.5
Source: OECD (2002)
Table 1.2: Manufacturing Intra-Industry Trade
as a Share of Total Manufacturing Trade
importance of intra-industry trade increased over the 1990s (see Table 1.2).
The Rise in Offshoring Between the mid-nineteenth century and World
War I, when the global integration of goods markets thrived for the first time,
production of manufactured goods involved only a few steps, leaving little
room for the unbundling of production stages. The production of modern
manufactures, in contrast, involves a number of different production stages
that can, in principle, be decomposed geographically. Not only the fall in
transportation costs but also recent advances in information and communi-
cation technology (ICT) and the sharp decline in communication costs have
fostered the diffusion of production stages across national boundaries. These
developments enable firms to take advantage of international cost differences
and allow for a finer international division of labour. Moreover, as ICT per-
mits the electronic transmission of output and communications costs have
recently dropped to almost zero, many service tasks that were once consid-
ered to be largely impervious to international competition are almost freely
tradable today. A frequently discussed example in this regard is the move-
ment of US call centres to India. As a result, not only material but also
service offshoring is thriving.
index of the extent of intra-industry trade can be calculated as one minus the absolute
value of exports minus imports divided by the sum of exports and imports:
IITi,r = 1− |Exportsi,r − Importsi,r|
Exportsi,r + Importsi,r
.
This measure is bounded by zero and one. If there are no commodities in the same
product class i that are both exported and imported, the index takes on a value of zero.
In contrast, the index is one when exports and imports in product class i are balanced. To
obtain an index of intra-industry trade with all trading partners, for each partner country
r the bilateral index is weighted by the share of trade with partner r in total trade.
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Country 1995 2000
Germany 0.34 0.44
Japan 0.10 0.12
USA 0.14 0.19
UK 0.44 0.50
Source: OECD (2007)
Table 1.3: Index of Off-
shoring, 1995 and 2000
Broadly speaking, two types of offshoring can be distinguished between.
Offshore in-house sourcing describes the relocation of a production process to
a foreign affiliate of the firm, i.e. production remains within the boundaries
of a firm but takes place in a foreign country. Offshore in-house sourcing thus
concerns multinational enterprises (MNEs) and involves foreign direct invest-
ment (FDI). Offshore outsourcing, in contrast, designates the contracting-out
of production activities to a foreign non-affiliated supplier. While offshoring
is notoriously difficult to measure, the share of imported intermediate prod-
ucts in total inputs gives a reasonable approximation.5 Harmonised input-
output tables provided by the OECD then allow for a cross-country compar-
ison of the offshoring intensity. Table 1.3 shows that in 2000 the UK and
Germany imported 50 and 44 percent, respectively, of all intermediate (non-
energy) inputs from abroad.6 The share was considerably lower in Japan and
the USA. Since offshoring is a relatively new phenomenon and harmonised
input-output tables were – at the time of writing – only available for 1995
and 2000, Table 1.3 can only provide a very limited overview of how off-
shoring evolved over time. Yet in all four countries considered, the degree of
offshoring increased considerably between 1995 and 2000.
Foreign Direct Investment and Multinational Enterprises. Multi-
national firms7 are key players in the globalised world economy. In 2007, the
value added of the estimated 79,000 MNEs and their 790,000 foreign affiliates
accounted for 11 percent of global GDP. Multinational enterprises employed
5See Chapter 5 for a more detailed discussion of the offshoring indicator and a detailed
review of recent trends in Germany.
6Since a direct measure of imported inputs does not exist for every country, the OECD
(2007) approximated the value of imported inputs by multiplying the purchases of an input
j with the import share in total absorption of the intermediate.
7MNEs are defined as firms that own a significant equity share (typically 50 percent or
more) of another company operating in a foreign country.
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FDI inflows are measured in current prices.
Figure 1.2: Inward FDI Flows in Millions of US Dollars, by Host Region,
1970 - 2007
82 million people and sold goods and services worth 31 trillion US dollars
(UNCTAD, 2008).
The dramatic increase in foreign direct investment in the last two decades
or so documents the important role that multinational firms play in the glob-
alisation process. FDI is an investment made to acquire a lasting manage-
ment interest – usually at least 10 percent of the voting stock – in a foreign
company. MNEs undertake foreign direct investment to create, acquire or ex-
pand foreign subsidiaries. Figure 1.2 graphs the development of annual FDI
inflows since the 1970s. After the sharp decline at the turn of the millennium,
global FDI inflows rose to an all-time high of 1,833 billion US dollars in 2007.
Between 1985 and 2007 FDI inflows achieved an average annual growth rate
of 17.2 percent. Global GDP, in contrast, has increased by only 7 percent per
annum over the same time period.8 Figure 1.3 furthermore shows that the
worldwide inward FDI stock as a percentage of GDP increased from 6.6 per-
cent in 1980 to 27.9 percent in 2007. From a European perspective, the fall
of the iron curtain and the European integration process have significantly
8The figures relate to FDI inflows and GDP measured in current prices.
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Figure 1.3: Inward FDI Stock as a Percentage of GDP, by Host Region, 1980
- 2007
increased the attractiveness of Eastern European countries as FDI destina-
tions – with Western European countries being among the leading sources
of FDI outflows. The FDI stock of German enterprises in Poland, Hungary
and the Czech Republic, for instance, amounted to 45.4 billion euros in 2007
– compared to just 9.5 billion euros ten years earlier (Deutsche Bundesbank,
2009).
Since the relocation of production processes to a foreign affiliate (offshore
in-house sourcing) involves FDI, the rise in offshoring and the increasing
importance of MNEs are to some extent related. In fact, MNEs exploit
international cost differences by decomposing their production stages geo-
graphically (so-called vertical FDI). However, multinational firms also invest
in foreign countries so as to serve the local market directly through a local
subsidiary and save on trade costs. In that case, the production process
is not unbundled but the same product or service is produced in multiple
countries (horizontal FDI). Thus, FDI can either be driven by cost-saving or
market-seeking motives. Available data do not allow to distinguish directly
between the two types of FDI. Cost-saving (or vertical) FDI should, however,
mainly flow from developed to developing countries, whereas market-seeking
FDI can be expected between home and host countries that are similar in
Chapter 1. Introduction and Overview 13
country sizes and relative endowments (cf. Markusen, 2002). Since FDI flows
mainly originate in developed countries and also predominately flow to devel-
oped countries, the bulk of FDI appears to be horizontal rather than vertical.
In fact, developed countries accounted for 84.8 percent of FDI outflows and
received 68.1 percent of FDI inflows in 2007.
1.3 Outline of Thesis
My thesis consists of four main chapters that pick up different aspects of
the globalisation process characterised in the previous subsection and anal-
yse their interactions with the labour market. Chapters 2 to 4 comprise
theoretical work; Chapter 5 presents an empirical study.
The starting points of Chapter 2 that has been published in a slightly
modified version in the Review of International Economics 16(5), pages 864-
873, are two empirical observations. First, in the USA spending on industrial
research and development (R&D) have increased sharply since the 1980s.
Second, paralleling the rise in R&D expenditures, the USA (and other in-
dustrialised countries) experienced a breakdown in the relative demand for
unskilled workers. Against this background, Chapter 2 examines whether
(i) economic integration – in the form of lower trading barriers – have been
a driving force behind the large increase in industrial R&D funding and
whether (ii) these higher investments in R&D have contributed to the de-
cline in the demand for unskilled labour.
These questions are studied in a simple model of international oligopoly,
in which firms can invest in both process and product innovation. Process
innovation decreases marginal production costs, whereas product innovation
reduces the substitutability between competing product varieties. In order
to conduct R&D, firms hire skilled workers; production, in contrast, requires
unskilled workers. Economic integration intensifies international competition
and induces competing firms to invest more aggressively in both product and
process innovation. The relative demand for skilled workers increases as a
result.
The paper presented in Chapter 2 is most closely related to a study
by Neary (2002). He demonstrates that a reduction in import barriers in-
duces firms to increase their strategic investment in process R&D in order to
blockade entry of foreign competitors. Assuming R&D to be skilled-labour
intensive, dismantling trading barriers then increases the wage premium of
skilled workers. While Neary (2002) focuses on the threat of import com-
petition into the home market, I analyse the decision process of a firm that
simultaneously serves the home and the foreign market and concentrate on
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situations in which intra-industry trade actually occurs. More importantly,
I extend Neary’s work to allow for product R&D, which is - at least in the
USA - quantitatively more important than process R&D (cf. Scherer and
Ross, 1990).
Chapter 3 is motivated by a widely noticed paper of Davis (1998a) that
studies the labour market consequences of trade between a flexible-wage Eu-
rope and a rigid-wage America. With free trade factor prices are equalised
across countries and the minimum wage in Europe pins down wages in both
countries. Europe then has to endure the full unemployment level of the inte-
grated economy. Opening up trade between the two countries therefore props
up American wages and sharply increases European unemployment. Davis
(1998a) thus concludes that national factor markets cannot be considered in
isolation when goods markets are linked globally.
The results of Davis (1998a) and also related findings by a number of
follow-up studies (see, e.g., Meckl, 2006; Kreickemeier and Nelson, 2006) are
derived in a Heckscher-Ohlin setting with factor price equalisation. Existing
studies therefore focus on inter-industry trade and – since they invoke the
factor price equalisation theorem – rest on stark assumptions such as free
trade, common technologies and diversified production. Chapter 3, in con-
trast, analyses labour market outcomes in a model of intra-industry trade
between a rigid-wage Europe and a flexible-wage America. Firms can choose
to serve the foreign market either through exporting or through local sub-
sidiaries. Trade costs are non-negligible and the paper therefore concentrates
on the empirically important case where factor prices do not equalise across
trading partners.
Within this model framework I find the adverse employment and welfare
effects of an asymmetric minimum wage to be significantly larger when goods
markets are not isolated but linked globally. In contrast to public perception,
multinational firms can actually help to alleviate the negative effects arising
from global competition in the presence of one-sided labour market rigidities.
I furthermore show that – even though factor prices are not equalised across
countries – the introduction of a (binding) minimum wage in Europe increases
American wages. Chapter 3 also illustrates that America is insulated from
any shocks caused by European factor accumulation, while the reverse is not
true.
Next, Chapter 4 turns towards a classical question in labour economics,
namely what unions do to productivity and firm performance. Conventional
wisdom suggests that unionised firms earn lower profits – simply because
they have to pay higher wages. However, an equivalent positive union effect
on productivity could, in principle, make up for higher union wages. Theo-
retically, unionisation has an ambiguous effect on the incentives of firms to
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innovate. On the one hand, unionisation is associated with a classical hold-up
problem. Once a firm has incurred the sunk costs of investment, unions can
capture part of the innovation rent by demanding higher wages. Unionised
firms thus have lower incentives to innovate than their non-unionised com-
petitors (Grout, 1984). On the other hand, unionised enterprises may enjoy
a strategic advantage over their non-unionised competitors if R&D is under-
taken for strategic reasons (see, e.g., Ulph and Ulph, 1998, for a discussion).
Existing studies on the relation between unionisation and innovation incen-
tives have focused on oligopolistic markets, characterised by a small and fixed
number of firms. Unionisation, however, is likely to also influence the market
structure, i.e. the number and characteristics of firms, which in turn deter-
mine average productivity and firm performance more generally. Moreover,
the existing literature has mainly concentrated on firm-level bargaining and
thus has neglected sector-wide wage agreements that are still widespread in
continental Europe.
My objective in Chapter 4 is to analyse the interactions between bargain-
ing structures, the market environment and firm performance. For doing so,
I set up a monopolistic competition model with heterogeneous firms and free
entry. The model incorporates both differences in firm productivity and en-
dogenous mark-ups that respond to the intensity of competition in a market.
Within this model framework I contrast the effects of centralised and decen-
tralised wage bargaining on productivity and firm performance and compare
the results to the benchmark case of a perfectly competitive labour market.
The study identifies two channels through which unionisation affects pro-
ductivity and firm performance that have been largely overlooked in previous
work. First, sector- but not firm-level bargaining induces tougher selection
among heterogeneous producers and increases average productivity. Second,
the increase in wages associated with both bargaining regimes discourages
entry and decreases competitive pressures. With competition being less in-
tensive surviving firms can charge higher mark-ups and thus ceteris paribus
earn higher profits. Overall, I find centralised bargaining to result in higher
average levels of productivity and profits than either decentralised bargaining
or a competitive labour market. Extending the model to an open economy
setup, I furthermore show that the positive effect of centralised bargaining
on average productivity can be overturned when firms face international low-
wage competition. Thus, I again find that the effects of national labour mar-
ket institutions can change markedly when product markets become global
in scope.
Finally, Chapter 5, which is a joint work with Ronald Bachmann, analy-
ses empirically the effect of offshoring on workers’ labour market transitions
in Germany. For doing so, we combine an administrative micro data set con-
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taining daily information on individual workers’ employment histories with
offshoring indicators at the industry level. Although the empirical literature
on the issue is very thin (and theoretical studies virtually non-existent), we
are not the first to study the effects of offshoring on transitional labour mar-
ket dynamics in Germany. However, while the only other existing study for
Germany (Geishecker, 2008) is concerned with job stability only, we addi-
tionally distinguish between three different worker flows that can result from
the separation of an employer-employee match: direct job-to-job transitions,
the flow from employment to unemployment, and the flow from employment
to non-participation. Since these different transitions can have very different
reasons and welfare implications, the distinction is crucial for a thorough as-
sessment of the effects offshoring has on transitional labour market dynamics.
Furthermore, we not only consider the manufacturing sector as other studies
do, but also analyse the service sector and thus take into account the fact
that offshoring increasingly affects services.
Our results suggests that the effects of offshoring on labour market transi-
tions are not uniform but vary between sectors and across skill levels and age
groups. While offshoring does not affect overall job stability in the manufac-
turing sector, flows from employment in manufacturing to non-participation
display a negative correlation with offshoring. In the service sector, in con-
trast, we find offshoring to be associated with an increase in overall job
stability. Furthermore, the effects of offshoring vary strongly by age and skill
level, especially in the manufacturing sector. Here, while overall job stabil-
ity remains unaffected by offshoring, older workers experience a significant
decline in their job stability.
Chapter 2
Economic Integration, Process
and Product Innovation, and
Relative Skill Demand
Abstract. The interaction between economic integration, product and process
innovation, and relative skill demand is analysed in a model of international
oligopoly. Lower trading barriers increase the degree of foreign competition.
The competing enterprises respond by investing more aggressively in lowering
marginal costs of production. Moreover, firms reduce the substitutability of
their products through additional investment in product innovation. The
paper also shows that the relative demand for skilled workers may increase
as a result.
2.1 Introduction
Data for the USA show that industrial R&D funding increased sharply in
the 1980s and 1990s (see Figure 2.1). In 2006, R&D expenditures of the
business sector amounted to 192.4 billion US dollars compared to just 52.7
billion in 1979 (measured in constant 2000 US dollars). While the ratio of
industrial R&D expenditures to GDP remained fairly constant throughout
the 1960s and 1970s, it rose from about 1 percent in 1979 to 1.43 percent in
1990 and 1.69 percent in 2006 (down from 1.90 in 2000). Paralleling the rise
in industrial R&D spending, the USA (and other industrialised countries)
experienced a breakdown in the relative demand for unskilled workers.1
1For a recent paper that reviews the ongoing academic debate in this area and provides
detailed empirical evidence on trends in US wage inequality see Autor et al. (2008).
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Figure 2.1: Industrial R&D Expenditures, Total and Relative to GDP, USA
1960 - 2004
Against this background, the purpose of the present paper is twofold.
First, to provide an analysis of the effects of lower trading barriers on the
incentives of firms to undertake R&D investment. Second, to explore the
subsequent effect on firms’ demand for skilled relative to unskilled workers.
By doing so, the study provides some insights into the question of whether
(i) economic integration might have been a driving force of the large increase
in industrial R&D funding and whether (ii) higher investments in R&D may
have contributed to the aforementioned developments in the labour market.
Towards this aim, a simple model of international oligopoly is set up. Firms
operate in segmented markets and can invest in both process and product
innovation. Process innovation allows firms to produce at lower marginal
production costs. Product innovation is understood as a means of reduc-
ing the substitutability between goods. Therefore, the focus lies on innova-
tion within a given product life-cycle (rather than on the invention of new
products). Firms hire skilled workers for performing R&D while production
requires solely unskilled workers.2
2One could also assume that R&D is relatively more skill-intensive than production.
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Economic integration is then modelled as a reduction in trading costs be-
tween segmented markets. Competitive pressures increase and induce firms
to invest more in lower marginal production costs and a greater degree of
product differentiation. In fact, investing in one type of R&D also provides
additional incentives to invest in the other. Thus, process and product in-
novations are found to be complementary. Higher investments in R&D raise
relative skill demand both directly through higher demand for skilled workers
and indirectly through a reduction in the requirements of unskilled workers
per unit of production. For conventional functional form assumptions these
effects will outweigh the positive effect on the demand for unskilled workers
resulting from an increase in total output following a reduction in trading
barriers.
There exists a small theoretical literature that focuses on both process
and product innovation at the same time. Lin and Saggi (2002) investigate
the relationship between process and product R&D in a three-stage model.
Before production takes place, firms decide first on product R&D and then on
the level of process R&D. In contrast, Rosenkranz (2003) analyses the strate-
gic decision of oligopolists that simultaneously choose product and process
innovation. Weiss (2003) examines the effect of changes in the degree of
competition on firms’ decision to engage in either process or product R&D.
Finally, Bandyopadhyay and Acharyya (2004) study the complementarity
between process and product innovation in a vertically differentiated monop-
olistic market. However, neither the issue of economic integration nor any
labour market effects are considered in these studies. Instead of focusing
on a single market the present work analyses the effects of a change in the
competitive environment on (the interplay of) the two types of innovation in
an international oligopoly.
The paper at hand is more closely related to studies by Neary (2002) and
Haaland and Kind (2008). Neary (2002) demonstrates that a reduction in
import barriers will induce firms to increase their strategic investment so as
to block the entry of foreign competitors. Assuming investment to be skilled-
labour intensive (relative to production), lower trading barriers increase the
wage premium of skilled workers as well as the ratio of skilled to unskilled
workers employed. Haaland and Kind (2008) analyse the interaction between
trading costs, process innovation and R&D subsidies. Among other things
their study illustrates that trade liberalisation may increase private and social
incentives to invest in cost-saving R&D.
The present paper shares some similarities with these two studies but
The extreme assumption of skilled and unskilled workers being the only inputs in R&D
and production, respectively, just simplifies the model.
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crucial differences exist. While Neary (2002) studies the threat of import
competition in the home market, the focus of the present study is on the
decision process of a firm that simultaneously serves the home and the for-
eign market, and on situations in which intra-industry trade actually occurs.
The model abstracts from the strategic value of investment and shows that
economic integration increases the efficiency of R&D investments. Haaland
and Kind (2008), on the other hand, do not consider labour market effects
of the interaction between trading costs and R&D investments. More impor-
tantly, neither Neary (2002) nor Haaland and Kind (2008) deal with product
innovation, but concentrate on process innovation only. Given the fact that
in the USA product R&D seems to be quantitatively more important than
process R&D,3 extending the analysis to incorporate both types of R&D is
of great importance.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2.2 presents the basic
model. The interaction between economic integration and the incentives of
firms to invest in process and product innovation is analysed in Section 2.3.
Section 2.4 then studies the subsequent effects on the relative skill demand
of firms. Finally, Section 2.5 offers some concluding remarks and briefly
describes how the setting could be implemented into a general equilibrium
framework.
2.2 The Model Setting
There are two identical countries, Home (H) and Foreign (F), and two firms.
Firm 1 is located in Home, while firm 2 is located in Foreign. Given the
symmetry of the model, we shall only present equations for Home. Analogous
equations exist for Foreign as well.
Each of the two firms produces a differentiated good. The utility of the
representative consumer is a function of the two goods and the numeraire
good m and is given by
U (e, q1H , q2H ,m) = a (q1H + q2H)− 12
(
q21H + q22H + 2eq1Hq2H
)
+m, (2.1)
where e ∈ [0, 1] is an inverse measure of product differentiation and q1H and
q2H denote consumption of the good produced by firm 1 and 2, respectively.
Utility maximisation then gives rise to the following linear inverse demand
3Scherer and Ross (1990) suggest that at about three-quarters of R&D investment by
firms in the USA is devoted to product innovation.
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functions:
p1H (e, q1H , q2H) = a− (q1H + eq2H) , (2.2)
p2H (e, q1H , q2H) = a− (eq1H + q2H) , (2.3)
where piH is the price of firm i’s good in Home.
On the supply side, the two firms are assumed to compete as Cournot
duopolists in segmented markets. Firms incur symmetric trading costs of
t per unit of exports. Trading costs are exogenously given and incorporate
a wide range of costs, including, for instance, transportation expenditures,
tariffs or costs of border formalities.
In order to produce one unit of its respective good, firm i has to employ
α(ki) ∈ [0, a] units of unskilled labour. Unit costs of production are then
given by α(ki)w with w being the (exogenous) wage rate of the unskilled.4
By increasing the investment in process R&D, denoted by ki, firms can lower
their unit requirements in unskilled labour. I assume that ∂α
∂ki
< 0, ∂2α
∂2ki
≥ 0.
Moreover, the competitors determine the extent of product differentiation,
e(d1, d2) with ∂e∂di < 0 and
∂2e
∂2di
≥ 0 , through investment in product innovation
di. Note that product R&D shifts outward not only the demand function of
the innovating firm but also the one of its competitor.
The costs of R&D investment are incurred in terms of wages for skilled
workers. In order to undertake process and product R&D investment, firms
have to hire Sk(ki) and Sd(di) skilled workers, respectively, with ∂S
k
∂ki
> 0,
∂Sd
∂di
> 0 and ∂2Sk
∂2ki
> 0, ∂2Sd
∂2di
> 0. To obtain interior solutions, it is further
imposed that Sk(0) = 0, Sd(0) = 0, and limki→k∗i S
k(ki) =∞ (with α(k∗i ) =
0), limdi→d∗i S
d(di) = ∞ (with e(d∗1, d∗2) = 0). Skilled workers are paid an
exogenous wage rate r. The profit of the firm located in Home is then given
by
Π1 =p1H (e, q1H , q2H) q1H + [p1F (e, q1F , q2F )− t]q1F − (q1H + q1F )α(k1)w
− [Sk(k1) + Sd(d1)]r, (2.4)
where the subscript F is used to mark variables referring to Foreign. Firms
maximise profits by choosing simultaneously their output levels in the two
markets as well as their investments in process and product innovation.5
4Section 5 briefly describes how the setting could be implemented into a general equi-
librium framework with endogenous factor prices.
5In an alternative setup, investment decisions might be made before production takes
places. Then firms also face strategic motives to undertake R&D investment. However,
this would not change the results of the paper. The strategic motives for R&D investment
are also well understood and discussed in, for instance, Lin and Saggi (2002), Neary (2002)
and Rosenkranz (2003).
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2.3 Economic Integration and R&D Invest-
ment
The optimal levels of process and product R&D are considered first. Tak-
ing the first derivative of profits with respect to the investment in process
innovation yields the following first-order condition:
∂Sk(k1)
∂k1
r = −∂α(k1)
∂k1
(q1H + q1F )w. (2.5)
Marginal costs equal the incremental increase in wages paid to skilled work-
ers, while benefits are given in terms of the marginal reduction in production
costs. The first-order condition for the optimal level of product innovation
reads
∂Sd(d1)
∂d1
r = −∂e(d1, d2)
∂d1
(q2Hq1H + q2F q1F ). (2.6)
Again, marginal costs of investing in process innovation equal the marginal
increase in the employment of skilled workers times the wage rate. Marginal
benefits are given by the resulting increase in product prices in the two
markets multiplied by the respective output level.
Holding R&D investments fixed, one can further derive the optimal out-
put decisions as
q1H =

1
2 [a− α(k1)w] for Γ ≤ 0
1
4−e2 [(2− e)a+ et− 2α(k1)w + eα(k2)w] otherwise
(2.7)
q1F =
0 for Γ ≤ 01
4−e2 [(2− e)a− 2t− 2α(k1)w + eα(k2)w] otherwise
(2.8)
with Γ = 24−e2 (eα(k2)w − 2α(k1)w − 2t) + 22+ea.
In the (symmetric) Cournot equilibrium, it further holds that q1H = q2F ,
q1F = q2H as well as d1 = d2 = d, k1 = k2 = k. Equations (2.5) - (2.8) can
now be used to analyse the link between economic integration, i.e. a decrease
in trading costs t, and firm’s investment in product and process innovation.
Consider first the case, in which trade barriers will prevent firms from
exporting. The competitors act as unconstrained monopolists in their na-
tional markets. While the monopolists will invest in process innovation to
reap the benefits of reducing production costs, they refrain from investing in
product innovation.6 The reason is simply that a monopolist does not profit
from differentiating its product from the one of a non-existing competitor.
6Formally, this can seen from equation (2.6) and the fact that q1F = q2H = 0.
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Marginal decreases in trading barriers will not alter the equilibrium outcome
as long as exports are not profitable. Hereafter, attention is restricted to the
more interesting case of positive levels of intra-industry trade.7
Equations (2.7) and (2.8) show that for any given level of R&D invest-
ment and with positive exports, economic integration has two competing
effects on the optimal output level of a firm: On the one hand, protection of
the domestic market and, hence, domestic sales decline; on the other hand,
reducing trading barriers will increase exports. It is easily verified that due
to the increase in competitive pressures in both markets the positive effect
on output has to prevail (i.e. ∂(q1H+q1F )
∂t
< 0). This, in turn, will affect the
incentives of firms to undertake R&D investments.
First, a higher level of total output increases the benefits of reducing
marginal production costs thereby inducing additional investment in process
R&D.8 Second, the pro-competitive effect of lower trading barriers also pro-
vides additional incentives to invest in product innovations. In the domestic
market, intensified foreign competition makes product differentiation more
valuable since it now has a stronger impact on market prices. This effect
dominates the negative effect that the reduction in domestic output has on
the incentives to invest in product innovations. In the export market, the
ability to charge higher prices (for a given level of output) pays off more with
low levels of trading costs because of the rise in production for the foreign
market. The effect exceeds the negative one resulting from lower output
of the domestic firm (leading to lower benefits in terms of the impact that
product differentiation has on the market price).
Formally, the positive effect of economic integration on product innova-
tion can be shown by differentiating the marginal benefit of product R&D
with respect to t. Using q1H = q2F , q1F = q2H and equations (2.7) and (2.8),
I find
∂
(
−∂e(d1,d2)
∂d1
(q2Hq1H + q2F q1F )
)
∂t
= −2∂e(d1, d2)
∂d1
(
∂q1H
∂t
q1F +
∂q1F
∂t
q1H
)
= −2∂e(d1, d2)
∂d1
(
eq1F
4− e2 −
2q1H
4− e2
)
, (2.9)
which has to be negative given that ∂e
∂di
< 0, 2 > e and q1H > q1F .
Now consider the subsequent effect of increasing the investment in (process
and product) R&D. Not surprisingly, lower marginal production cost will
induce firms to raise the output for both markets. With k1 = k2 = k the
7A sufficient but not necessary condition for positive levels of intra-industry trade is
a− α(0)w > 2t.
8This effect has also been found by Haaland and Kind (2008).
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derivatives of output with respect to the investment in product R&D are
given by
∂q1H
∂k
= ∂q1F
∂k
= − 14− e2 (2− e)
∂α(k)
∂k
w > 0. (2.10)
Thus, process innovation will expand output levels. Equations (2.5) and (2.6)
show that this will lead to further investments in process and product R&D
(remember that q1H = q2F and q1F = q2H in equilibrium). In particular, note
that there are two reasons why higher equilibrium levels of k provide addi-
tional incentives for a firm to invest in product R&D. First, the production
of the competitor increases and, hence, product differentiation yields higher
marginal benefits in terms of the positive effect on market prices. Second, the
firm’s own output increases and the higher market prices apply to a higher
level of production.
A similar result can be established for investment in product R&D. A
higher degree of product differentiation (∆e < 0) extends the market size9
and increases total production. With k1 = k2 = k I obtain
∂(q1H + q1F )
∂e
= − 1(2 + e)2 [2a− t− 2α(k)w] < 0. (2.11)
Hence, product innovation leads to higher output levels and provides further
incentives for process innovation. The subsequent effect on product R&D
depends on the product rather than on the sum of the two output levels and
is less obvious. While a higher degree of product differentiation unambigu-
ously raises exports, the marginal effect on domestic output is undetermined
and depends on the level of trading barriers. Taking the first derivatives of
equations (2.7) and (2.8) with respect to e (and imposing k1 = k2 = k) yields
∂q1H
∂e
= −a− α(k)w(2 + e)2 +
(4 + e2)t
(4− e2)2 , (2.12)
∂q1F
∂e
= −a− α(k)w(2 + e)2 −
4et
(4− e2)2 < 0. (2.13)
Inserting the upper and lower bounds of t for positive trading volumes (as
given by (1 − 0.5e)[a − α(k)w] and 0) into equation (2.12) shows that the
derivative might take either sign.10 For high trading costs the domestic firm
gains little from product differentiation in the domestic market. Export
volumes are low and a reduction in e leads to relatively small gains in terms
9Note that demand for a given price level is increasing in the degree of product differ-
entiation.
10Inserting the upper bound of t reveals that the resulting expression is positive for
2e− 0.5e3 > 0. This condition is fulfilled in the relevant range of 0 < e < 1.
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of higher market prices. The exporter, in contrast, can charge considerably
higher prices when e is reduced and therefore expands exports significantly.
Since output levels are strategic substitutes, the domestic firm responds by
cutting output levels. For high levels of protection the latter effect might
well outweigh the positive effect and domestic output shrinks.
However, it can be shown that even if product innovation led to decreasing
levels of domestic output, the positive effect on exports would be large enough
to increase the marginal benefits of product R&D even further. A formal
proof of this finding is provided in Appendix A.1. The main results of this
section are summarised in
Proposition 1. For positive levels of intra-industry trade lower trading bar-
riers (lower values of t) will increase total output and the investment of firms
in both process and product R&D. Higher investment in process and product
innovations will translate into further changes in output, which induce firms
to invest even more in both types of R&D. Thus, process and product R&D
are found to be complementary.
2.4 Economic Integration and Relative La-
bour Demand
After having analysed the effects of economic integration on the choice of out-
put levels and R&D investments, the subsequent impact on relative labour
demand is examined now. Demand for skilled workers S is the sum of work-
ers required for the chosen level of process and product R&D, respectively.
Demand for unskilled workers U is given by total output multiplied by α(ki),
the requirement of unskilled workers per unit of production. Relative labour
demand of firm 1 can therefore be written as(
S
U
)Demand
= S
k(k1) + Sd(d1)
(q1H + q1F )α(k1)
. (2.14)
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Differentiating with respect to t yields the effect of a marginal change in
trading costs on relative skill demand:
∂
(
S
U
)Demand
∂t
=
[
∂Sk(k1)
∂t
+ ∂Sd(d1)
∂t
]
(q1H + q1F )α(k1)
[(q1H + q1F )α(k1)]2
−
∂α(k1)
∂t
[Sk(k1) + Sd(d1)](q1H + q1F )
[(q1H + q1F )α(k1)]2
−
∂(q1H+q1F )
∂t
[Sk(k1) + Sd(d1)]α(k1)
[(q1H + q1F )α(k1)]2
. (2.15)
The analysis of equation (2.15) leads directly to
Proposition 2. Economic integration has three competing effects on relative
skill demand. First, lower trading barriers increase the investment in prod-
uct and process innovation, which translates into higher demand for skilled
workers. Second, investment in process innovation reduces the per-unit re-
quirements of unskilled labour in production. Hence, for any given level of
output demand for the unskilled declines. The third effect works in the oppo-
site direction. Economic integration increases output and raises the demand
for unskilled workers holding α(ki) constant.
Without additional functional form assumptions the sign of equation
(2.15) cannot be determined. In order to learn more about the interaction
between economic integration, investment in R&D, and relative skill demand,
specific functional forms are considered now. Following the relevant litera-
ture11 R&D investment is assumed to reduce production costs and increase
product differentiation in a linear way. The degree of product differentiation
is then given by e = 1 − (d1 + d2) with di ∈ [0, 0.5], while the requirement
of unskilled labour per unit of output is determined as α(ki) = c − ki with
ki ∈ [0, c]. Furthermore, investment costs are assumed to be quadratic, i.e.
Sk(ki) = 0.5k2i and Sd(di) = 0.5d2i . With these functional form assumptions,
the first-order conditions for the optimal levels of investment in process and
product investment for firm 1 read
k1r = (q1H + q1F )w, (2.16)
d1r = q2Hq1H + q2F q1F . (2.17)
Now, one can solve for R&D investments, which then determine skilled labour
demand given the functional form assumptions. Substituting into equation
11See for instance, Neary (2002) and Haaland and Kind (2008) for process R&D as well
as Lin and Saggi (2002) for process and product R&D.
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(2.14), imposing q1H = q2F , q1F = q2H and also replacing α(k1) by c − k1
yield (
S
U
)Demand
=
w2
2r2 (q1H + q1F )
2 + 2
r2 (q
2
1Hq
2
1F )
(q1H + q1F )(c− k1) . (2.18)
This expression allows us to find an unambiguous effect of economic integra-
tion on relative skill demand. In fact, differentiating with respect to trading
barriers and some calculus reveal
Proposition 3. With quadratic investment costs and linear effects of R&D
investments on production cost and the degree of product differentiation,
lower trading costs will raise skill demand. In fact, the first effect identi-
fied in proposition 2 (i.e. the direct positive effect on skilled labour demand)
suffices to outweigh the third (i.e. the positive effect on unskilled labour de-
mand resulting from the rise in output levels).
The proof is relegated to Appendix A.2.
2.5 Conclusion
This paper has set up a simple model of international oligopoly to study
the interaction between lower trading barriers and the investment of firms in
process and product innovation. Increased competition following economic
integration induces firms to bring down production costs by investing more
aggressively in process R&D. At the same time, competitors expand their
investments in product innovation in order to reduce the substitutability of
their products. Assuming R&D to be intensive in skilled-labour (relative
to production), the paper further illustrates that economic integration may
increase the relative demand for skilled workers.
In order to study the effects of the interaction between economic inte-
gration and R&D investment on aggregate labour markets more thoroughly,
a relevant path for further research is the integration of the model into a
general equilibrium framework. A promising way to proceed could be the
development of a General Oligopolistic Equilibrium Model (GOLE) as pro-
posed by Neary (2003). The key idea of this class of models is to think of
firms as being large in their sectors but small in the economy as a whole.
Consumers have additively separable preferences defined over a continuum
of goods produced in a continuum of industries. Since firms are then small
in comparison to the economy they take aggregate variables such as factor
prices and aggregate income as given. Hence, the approach avoids the usual
problems of modelling oligopolistic competition in general equilibrium.
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Applying the concept to the present paper, one might think of a model
with two symmetric countries. Each country hosts a continuum of sectors.
Abstracting from differences across sectors, each sector can be modelled as
described in section 2.2. Economic integration then raises skill demands in
all sectors. On the labour market, the relative supply of skilled to unskilled
workers may increase with relative factor prices. Increasing skill demands
(following a decline in trading costs) would translate into a higher skill pre-
mium and also increase the aggregate relative supply of skilled labour. These
findings correspond well with the empirical observations for the US labour
market.
Chapter 3
Foreign Competition,
Multinational Firms, and
One-Sided Wage Rigidity
Abstract. The paper studies the effects of a one-sided minimum wage in
a two-country model of intra-industry trade, in which multinational firms
arise endogenously. With positive levels of intra-industry trade the adverse
employment and welfare effects of an asymmetric minimum wage are signif-
icantly larger than in a non-trading economy. Multinational firms generally
mitigate the effect somewhat. Even though factor prices are not equalised
across countries, a (binding) wage floor in one country will prop up wages
in the other. The flexible-wage country is insulated from shocks caused by
factor accumulation in the rigid-wage country, while an increase in the labour
supply of the latter economy may have profound impacts on labour market
outcomes in both countries.
3.1 Introduction
The closer economic integration of the world economy is viewed with fear
and scepticism by many. In particular, the effects on employment and wages
of workers in developed countries are controversially discussed in the public
debate on the consequences of globalisation. International competitive pres-
sures and footloose multinational enterprises (MNEs) are widely feared to
bring down wages and endanger jobs in the Western world.1
1Scheve and Slaughter (2001) provide a comprehensive summary of the perceptions of
American workers about globalisation.
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In this context, national regulations that add to the rigidity of the labour
market have come under growing pressures. Increasing labour market flexi-
bility has been one of the major goals of recent reforms in OECD countries.
The political debates surrounding these reforms frequently discuss the neces-
sity of a flexible labour market for coping successfully with the challenges of
globalisation.2 In this regard, the relatively rigid labour markets in Conti-
nental Europe have been contrasted with those of the UK and the US char-
acterised by a high degree of flexibility. In particular, it has been suggested
that globalisation may result in systematically different labour market out-
comes depending on the characteristics of national labour market institutions
(Davis, 1998a; Krugman, 1995).
In his widely discussed contribution, Krugman (1995) analyses the effect
on OECD countries of opening up trade with low-wage developing countries
and distinguishes between a flexible-wage ‘American’ model and a ‘Euro-
pean’ model with fixed wages. While Krugman applies a general-equilibrium
framework separately to the two regimes of wage flexibility, Davis (1998a)
allows for economic linkages between the two economies. He considers trade
between a flexible-wage ‘America’ and a rigid-wage ‘Europe’ in a Heckscher-
Ohlin framework. The European labour market is characterised by a mini-
mum wage of the sort analysed by Brecher (1974).
Davis (1998a) shows that factor markets cannot be considered in isolation
when goods markets are linked globally. In his paper, the global equilibrium
is characterised by factor price equalisation (FPE) across countries. The
minimum wage in Europe pins down wages in both countries. European
workers have to absorb the full unemployment level of the integrated econ-
omy. Hence, a move from autarky to free trade will prop up American wages
and will sharply increase European unemployment. Davis (1998a) also shows
that the fixed minimum wage in Europe will insulate American wages against
shocks originating from factor accumulation in Europe while an increase in
the American labour supply increases European unemployment. Hence, in
his model divergent wage trends cannot be explained by cross-county differ-
ences in the evolution of labour supply.
Meckl (2006) extends the model by accounting for individual productivity
differences. Individual workers then also differ in their educational decisions
and labour supply is endogenous. Although the factor-price-equalisation
2For instance, the Kok (2004) report, designed to monitor the achievements towards
the Lisbon goals of the European Union, identifies increased global competition as a major
challenge for European labour markets and calls for finding a new balance between flexi-
bility and security. And in a recent report the academic advisory council at the German
Federal Ministry of Economics and Technology concludes that globalised markets require
additional labour market flexibility in Germany (BMWi, Wissenschaftlicher Beirat, 2006).
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property is preserved, the model does not share the insulation property with
Davis (1998a). However, European unemployment still props up American
wages. In a more recent paper, Kreickemeier and Nelson (2006) consider
somewhat less stark institutional assumptions. They postulate the existence
of fair wage constraints in both economies. Asymmetries arise due to dif-
ferent attitudes towards wage inequality. The paper develops an integrated
equilibrium concept for this type of model and shows that while the cen-
tral message of Davis persists, some results depend on the specific model
framework.
The major results of the papers mentioned have been derived in a Heck-
scher-Ohlin framework, in which the countries considered replicate an inte-
grated equilibrium with factor price equalisation. While the approach clearly
contributes to the transparency of the results, it rests on stark assumption
such as free trade, common technologies and diversified production.3 More-
over, the studies focus on inter-industry trade.4 However, trade flows between
developed countries and regions, such as Europe and the US, are largely char-
acterised by simultaneous exports and imports of similar products. A second
distinctive feature of the modern world economy is the widespread impor-
tance of foreign direct investment (FDI). Over the last two decades or so
FDI has increased sharply, both in absolute terms but also relative to the
levels of GDP and trade (see Figures 1.2 and 1.3).5 In this context, concerns
have been raised that multinational activities of firms could have detrimental
effects on the regulatory capacities of countries competing for FDI.
Against this background, the present paper adds to the scarce existing
literature by studying labour market outcomes in a model of intra-industry
trade with non-zero trading costs between a rigid-wage Europe and a flexible-
wage America, in which multinational enterprises arise endogenously.6 The
contributions of the study are thus twofold. First, trade costs are non-
3Davis himself is upfront on that point and also underline ’the value of pursuing ex-
tensions to the present study in which local factor supplies do matter’ Davis (1998b, p.
1616), in particular for improving our understanding of the divergent wage experiences in
the US and (continental) Europe.
4In a footnote, Davis (1998a) sketches how his results could in principle also be es-
tablished by applying an integrated equilibrium approach to a monopolistic competition
model with heterogeneous goods along the lines of Helpman and Krugman (1985).
5For an detailed overview of stylised facts on FDI see, for instance, Chapter 1 of
Navaretti and Venables (2004).
6The paper is not the first to consider the effect of multinational enterprises in a model
with labour market imperfections. For instance, Skaksen and Sorensen (2001) and Zhao
(1995, 1998) analyse the effect of multinational activity for the bargaining outcome in
an unionised labour market. However, none of the papers consider a general equilibrium
framework with asymmetric labour market institutions.
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negligible in the model and the paper therefore concentrates on the em-
pirically important case where factor prices do not equalise across trading
partners.7 The paper explicitly considers intra-industry trade and exam-
ines whether the stark results established by Davis (1998a) carry over to a
framework without factor price equalisation. Second, it analyses the labour
market effects of multinational firms in a general equilibrium framework with
asymmetric wage rigidities. The paper therefore sheds light on the role of
multinational enterprises for labour market developments in an increasingly
integrated world.
The basic framework is adopted from Markusen and Venables (1998) who
study the model under perfectly competitive factor markets. As in Davis
(1998a) downward wage rigidity is simply modelled as a lower bound on
wages and might reflect various institutions such as explicit minimum wages,
unemployment benefits, unions, etc. Firms can either enter as national en-
terprises producing in one country and possibly exporting to the other. Al-
ternatively, multinational enterprises will set up their headquarters in one
country but maintain production facilities in both. Hence, the focus lies
on horizontal direct investment which represents the bulk of FDI and is of
particular importance to the analysis of similar developed countries.
The effects of divergent national labour market institutions in the glob-
alised economy are contrasted with those derived in a closed economy setting
and those without allowing for the presence of multinational firms. The re-
sults suggest that the negative effect of a one-sided wage floor on unemploy-
ment in Europe is much larger with positive levels of intra-industry trade
than in a closed economy framework. Domestic production is substituted
by imports from America. Hence, labour demand falls more rapidly and
unemployment soars. The problem exacerbates itself as income and, hence,
demand will fall more rapidly with higher unemployment rates causing a
further decline in European production.8
7Oslington (2002) analyses asymmetric wage rigidity in a Heckscher-Ohlin model in
which Europe is specialised in the skill-intensive industry. FPE then also breaks down
and Europe is left with a lower skill premium than America. The paper shows that some
of Davis’ results will no longer hold in that case but confirms the overarching message
that factor markets cannot be considered in isolation when goods markets are global.
In contrast to the present paper, Oslington (2002) considers inter-industry trade and
abstracts from MNEs. Moreover, in a model of two developed countries (Europe and
America) non-negligible trade frictions may arguably be a more important reason for
factor prices not to be equalised than dissimilar endowments.
8This result resembles earlier findings established by Pflüger (2004) in a two-country
monopolistic competition model with exogenous wage differentials. Among other things,
the paper finds that in the absence of agglomeration forces a push in union wages in one
country induces firms to relocate to the other. The relocation effect is stronger the more
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Interestingly, multinational firms do not worsen this effect but generally
help to mitigate it. They are less affected by the one-sided minimum wage
than European national firms as parts of their costs are incurred in terms of
foreign labour. This allows them to operate for a wider range of (implicit)
minimum wages. European labour benefits as consumption is met with lo-
cal production. Hence, in contrast to public perception the study suggests
that (horizontal) MNEs can actually help to alleviate the negative effects
arising from global competition in the presence of one-sided labour market
institutions. Even though factor prices are not equalised across countries,
America sees its wage rate rising in the open economy setting with the in-
troduction of a minimum wage in Europe. Owing to a sort of home market
effect, American wages can actually rise above the minimum wage rate even
though countries are otherwise identical.
The paper also illustrates that America is indeed insulated from any
shocks caused by European factor accumulation. On contrary, factor ac-
cumulation in America has marked impacts on both countries with the exact
direction depending on the level of the minimum wage and the types of firms
active in the corresponding equilibrium. In fact, increases in national labour
supply can actually boost domestic wages by enhancing the competitiveness
of national firms in a globalised world.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 3.2 presents
the basic model framework. Partial equilibrium results are derived in Sec-
tion 3.3, while Section 3.4 presents the numerical simulation of the general
equilibrium. Section 3.5 analyses the impact of local factor accumulation on
labour market outcomes in the two countries. Finally, Section 3.6 concludes.
3.2 The Model Setting
The model9 studies two countries, which I call in accordance with Davis
(1998a) ‘Europe’ (e) and ‘America’ (a), producing two homogeneous goods,
X and Y . Two factors of production exist: labour (L) and resources (R).
While resources are specific to the Y sector, labour is mobile between sectors.
Both production factors are immobile across countries.
In the following, countries will be denoted by subscripts (i, j). Good Y
integrated the two countries are. In contrast to the present paper, the results are derived in
a model in which all income effects fall on the good produced by the competitive (outside)
sector. More importantly, owing to the exogenous determination of (union) wages in both
countries, wage changes in one country cannot, by assumption, affect wages in the other.
9As noted earlier, the basic framework is adopted from Markusen and Venables (1998)
who study the model with frictionless labour markets.
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is freely traded and chosen as the numeraire of the model; consequently its
price is normalised to one. Y is sold in a perfectly competitive market and
its production function is assumed to be Cobb-Douglas:
Yi = LαiyR1−αi with 0 ≤ α ≤ 1 and i = a, e, (3.1)
where Ri is the resource endowment of country i. Provided that prices are
fully flexible, the wage rate wi and the rental rate on R, ri, are given by their
marginal values in production10
wi = α
(
Liy
Ri
)α−1
, (3.2)
ri = (1− α)
(
Liy
Ri
)α
. (3.3)
However, while American wages are assumed to be fully flexible, they are
subjected to a binding minimum wage in Europe, i.e.
we = w. (3.4)
Note that this also implies that the labour demand of the Y sector in Europe
is fixed by equation (3.2) and the parameters α, Re and we.
The X good is sold in an imperfectly competitive market. There are four
different types of potential entrants in the market: (1) national firms located
in America, (2) national firms located in Europe, (3) multinational firms
headquartered in America, and (4) multinationals headquartered in Europe.
National firms produce in one of the two countries only and potentially export
to the other. They are denoted with the superscript n. Horizontal multina-
tionals, marked with the superscript m, have their headquarters in either of
the two countries but maintain production facilities in both countries. Fixed
costs consist of factor prices for G units of labour for the headquarters and F
units of labour for a factory. It is further assumed that producing a unit of
X requires c units of labour. Note that production technologies are identical
in the two countries. An exporting firm will additionally have to hire t units
of labour in order to ship a unit of output across the border.
Let Xkij denote the amount of output that a type k = n,m firm based in i
supplies to country j. Since national enterprises undertake all their produc-
tion in their base country, the demand of one national firm headquartered in
i for country i’s labour is
cXnii + (c+ t)Xnij +G+ F with i 6= j. (3.5)
10As pointed out in the original work of Markusen and Venables (1998), R serves to
add some convexity to the model. Higher levels of X production will increase the cost of
labour in terms of Y . Hence, labour supply to the non-competitive sector is increasing in
wi.
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In contrast, a national firm based in j will not demand any labour in i. A
multinational based in i will use labour for maintaining the headquarters and
a factory in i. Additionally, it requires labour for producing output for the
market of country i while supply to market j is met by local production.
Hence, labour demand of one multinational based in i for labour of country
i can be written as
cXmii +G+ F. (3.6)
Finally, a multinational enterprise based in j requires labour from country
i to support the local factory as well as to produce for the local market.
Demand for country i’s labour is then given by
cXmji + F. (3.7)
Let ni andmi denote the number of active national firms and multination-
als, respectively, with headquarters in country i. The sum of labour demands
from the different types of firms plus the unemployed units of labour, Ui, has
to equal the factor endowment. Hence, the labour market clearing condition
can be written as
Li =Ui + Liy + ni[cXii + (c+ t)Xnij +G+ F ] +mi(cXmii +G+ F )
+mj(cXmji + F ), (3.8)
where Ua = 0 due to the assumption of fully flexible-wages in America.
Since profits are driven down to zero in the (long-run) equilibrium, na-
tional income Mi will solely consist of factor rewards
Mi = wi(Li − Ui) + riRi, (3.9)
which accrue to a representative consumer in each country. The agent faces
a Cobb-Douglas utility function in the two goods
Zi = XβicY
1−β
ic (3.10)
with Zi denoting utility. Xic and Yic are the respective consumption levels
of the two goods. Utility maximisation gives rise to the following demand
functions:
Xic =
βMi
pi
, (3.11)
Yic = (1− β)Mi, (3.12)
where pi denotes the price of good X in country i. The goods market equi-
librium in sector X requires demand Xic to equal total supply. The latter
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is given by the sum of output levels of the different firm types multiplied by
the respective number of firms active in equilibrium
Xic = niXnii + njXnji +miXmii +mjXmji . (3.13)
The firms compete in Cournot fashion. Marginal revenue of a type k
firm based in i serving the market of country j is given by pj
(
1 + X
k
ij
XjC
1
ηj
)
=
pj(1 − skij). Here, ηj = − pjXjC
∂XjC
∂pj
is the price elasticity of demand while
skij denotes the respective proportional markup of prices over marginal costs.
With Cobb-Douglas preferences the price elasticity of demand is one, and
markups therefore equal the market share of the respective firm:
skij =
Xkij
XjC
=
pjX
k
ij
βMj
. (3.14)
Profit maximisation implies that marginal revenue equals marginal cost.
Written in complementary slackness form, the pricing equations are given
as follows:11
pi(1− snii) ≤ wic, (Xnii ≥ 0), (3.15)
pj(1− snij) ≤ wi(c+ t), (Xnij ≥ 0), (3.16)
pi(1− smii ) ≤ wic, (Xmii ≥ 0), (3.17)
pj(1− smij ) ≤ wjc ; (Xmij ≥ 0). (3.18)
Free entry will drive profits to zero in the long-run equilibrium. The
combination of firm types active is therefore determined by four zero-profit
conditions. They simply state for each firm type that markup revenues have
to be equal to or less than the fixed costs. Complementary variables are the
respective number of firms active in equilibrium.
pes
n
eeX
n
ee + pasneaXnea ≤ we(G+ F ), (ne ≥ 0), (3.19)
pas
n
aaX
n
aa + pesnaeXnae ≤ wa(G+ F ), (na ≥ 0), (3.20)
pes
m
eeX
m
ee + pasmeaXmea ≤ we(G+ F ) + waG, (me ≥ 0), (3.21)
pas
m
aaX
m
aa + pesmaeXmae ≤ wa(G+ F ) + weG, (ma ≥ 0). (3.22)
11Note that firms are assumed to ignore their potential impact on aggregate income
and economy-wide factor prices when choosing output levels. Recently, Neary (2003) has
argued that these inconsistencies of modelling oligopoly in general equilibrium can be
avoided by assuming firms to be large in their own market but small in the economy as a
whole. While for simplicity I stick to the formulation in Markusen and Venables (1998),
results would remain unchanged when considering a large number of identical sectors
instead of a single imperfectly competitive sector.
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The general equilibrium of the model is then determined through a system
of equalities and inequalities that solve simultaneously for the endogenous
variables of the model. Output levels in the X sector are associated with
pricing inequalities (3.15) - (3.18) together with the markup formula in (3.14).
The zero-profit conditions (3.19)-(3.22) determine the number of each firm
type active in equilibrium. Income levels are given by (3.9) while the price
of good X is established through equation (3.11) in combination with (3.13).
Finally, the wage rate in America and the unemployment rate in Europe are
determined by the labour market clearing condition in (3.8) together with
labour demand from the Y sector, equation (3.2), while the rental rate of R
is associated with equation (3.3).
3.3 Intuition from Partial Equilibrium Ana-
lysis
Before calculating the general equilibrium of the model numerically, I start
with deriving some results in a partial equilibrium setting. This is meant to
provide intuition for the general equilibrium results reported in the following
sections.
Equations (3.2) and (3.8) show that the American wage rate and the
unemployment rate in Europe depend crucially on labour demand of the X
sector. The latter, in turn, will depend on the type (and number) of firms
active in equilibrium as well as the output level of an individual firm. In
the flexible-wage setting, expanding X production draws labour from the Y
sector thereby increasing the R/L ratio in the competitive sector. Wages will
increase as a result. With wages fixed at a (binding) minimum wage, labour
demand of the Y sector is fixed by equation (3.2). The units of unemployed
labour in Europe are given by the total labour endowment minus labour
demands from the Y and X sector.
In the following, I analyse separately the effects of the introduction of a
binding (implicit) minimum wage in Europe, i.e. of an increase in we, on
the two crucial determinants of labour demand in the X sector. First, I
treat the number of active firms as exogenously given and study the effect
of a one-sided wage increase on output levels. The focus lies solely on the
imperfectly competitive sector and I do not consider feedback effects from
the labour market. The influence in a closed economy setting is compared
to the effect in an open economy setting with and without multinational
enterprises. Second, the effects of a one-sided wage increase on (potential)
profits of the four types of firms are considered. This will help to understand
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what kind of firms are likely to arise in equilibrium and how the introduction
of a minimum wage in Europe influences the location decisions of firms.
3.3.1 Effects of an Increase in the European Wage on
Output
Suppose first that the types (and the number) of firms active in equilibrium
are fixed. For concreteness I will assume that the two countries are identical
with respect to the number of active firms.12 Since demand functions derived
from a Cobb-Douglas utility function are not suitable to study monopoly I
further assume that ni = nj = n ≥ 2 (andmi = mj = n ≥ 2 if multinationals
are present). Now plug equation (3.14) into (3.15)-(3.16) and rearrange to
obtain inequalities for the output levels of national firms:
Xnii ≥ βMi
(
pi − wic
p2i
)
, (3.23)
Xnij ≥ βMj
[
pj − wi(c+ t)
p2j
]
. (3.24)
If the right-hand side is positive, the equations hold with equality, other-
wise output is zero. Consider first an equilibrium in which only non-exporting
national firms are active. I will refer to this scenario as the closed economy
setting. Keeping Y sector variables unchanged and abstracting from feed-
back effects from factor markets, equations (3.9), (3.11), (3.13) and (3.23)
allow to solve for production in terms of the then exogenous parameters:
Xnii =
β[wi(Li − Ui) + riRi](n− 1)
cn2wi
. (3.25)
Since just national firms producing for the domestic market are active, only
the production level Xnii is of interest to country i’s labour demand. Now
consider the effect of an increase in we on domestic production Xnee. An
increase in the minimum wage will raise income levels (given unemployment)
thereby boosting demand and production while at the same time depressing
output by raising marginal production costs. Taking the first derivative of
Xnee with respect to we reveals that the negative effect will prevail.13 The
wage elasticity of output, denoted by εc, is given by
εc ≡ ∂Xee
∂we
we
Xee
= − reSe
we(Le − Ue) + reRe , (3.26)
12The assumption does not affect the general results of this section but helps to clean
up the somewhat messy expressions.
13 ∂Xnee
∂we
= (n−1)β(Le−Ue)cn2we −
(n−1)β(we(Le−Ue)+Rere)
cn2w2e
= − (n−1)βreRecn2w2e < 0
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which is bounded by zero and minus one.
Next, consider an open economy with positive levels of intra-industry
trade. National firms do export but multinational firms are not present.
A national firm based in country i produces for both markets and labour
demand depends on Xnii and Xnij. Equations (3.9), (3.11), (3.13), (3.23) and
(3.24) can be solved simultaneously to find
Xnii =
(wi(Li − Ui) + riRi)(2n− 1)(nwj(c+ t)− c(n− 1)wi)
β−1(nwj(c+ t) + cnwi)2
, (3.27)
Xnji =
(wi(Li − Ui) + riRi)(2n− 1)(cnwi − (n− 1)wj(c+ t))
β−1(nwj(c+ t) + cnwi)2
. (3.28)
Now consider the wage elasticity of output of a national firm based in Europe
with respect to European wages we. First, note that the elasticity can be
decomposed as follows:
∂(Xnee +Xnea)
∂we
we
Xnee +Xnea
= ∂X
n
ee
∂we
we
Xnee
Xnee
Xnee +Xnea
+ ∂X
n
ea
∂we
we
Xnea
Xnea
Xnee +Xnea
= εoese + εoasa, (3.29)
where εoi is the wage elasticity of output produced for market i and si denotes
the share of production for market i in total production. Calculating the two
elasticities explicitly yields the following two expressions:
εoe ≡ ∂X
n
ee
∂we
we
Xnee
= cwe[(n− 1)cwe − (3n− 1)wa(c+ t)][nwa(c+ t)− c(n− 1)we][wa(c+ t) + cwe]
+ we(Le − Ue)
we(L− U) + reRe , (3.30)
εoa ≡ ∂X
n
ea
∂we
we
Xnea
= (c+ t)we[(n− 1)twe + c(wa − 3nwa + (n− 1)we)][we(c+ t) + cwa][c(nwa − we(n− 1))− twe(n− 1)] . (3.31)
By comparing the elasticities derived in a closed and in an open economy
setting the following result can be established:
Proposition 4. In an open economy setting with positive levels of intra-
industry trade the wage elasticities of production for both markets, εoe and
εoa, are smaller than the wage elasticity derived in a closed economy setting.
Proof. See Appendix B.1.
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The proposition shows that in an open economy one-sided changes in
the wage rate will have more severe effects on production (and, hence, on
labour demand) than in a closed economy. Intuitively, an increase in Euro-
pean wages only affects firms based in Europe. Therefore, firms will have
to reduce output not only because of the increase in marginal costs but also
due to the deterioration of their competitiveness relative to their American
counterparts. The latter effect is clearly absent in a closed economy setting.
Now consider a market in which multinational firms are active. Pricing
equations for multinational firms and national firms serving their local mar-
kets are exactly identical because both firms have a factory in the country
and, hence, face identical marginal costs. Multinational production relevant
for the European labour market is given by Xmee and Xmae. The wage elas-
ticity of multinational production will be the same as the wage elasticity of
production for the market in Europe of a national firm based in Europe. If a
multinational competes only with other multinationals or with national firms
based in Europe, the output elasticity will therefore equal εc, i.e. it will be
identical to the case of a closed economy. When competing with exporting
firms the elasticity will equal εoe.14
Increasing the European minimum wage may also affect the level of pro-
duction and thus labour demand in America. American production will
obviously be not affected if the two countries are closed economies with-
out any trade taking place. Increases in the minimum wage only influence
marginal costs of producers in Europe, and since these firms do not compete
with American firms the latter are not affected. In contrast, for the open
economy case the following result can be established:
Proposition 5. In an open economy setting with positive levels of intra-
industry trade the output of firms based in America, Xnae and Xnaa, will be
positively affected by increases in the European wage rate we.
Proof. See Appendix B.2.
Increases in we affect marginal costs of firms based in Europe but not
those of firms based in America. Consequently, the latter types of firms
14However, one difference exists when comparing MNEs to national firms. The multi-
national has an outside option to produce the output in its overseas facility and then
reimport it. It will do so whenever marginal production costs in Europe will exceed those
in America, i.e. whenever wec > wa(c+ t). Therefore, production in Europe plummets to
zero when the minimum wage is set too high. In terms of production, the multinational
firm then resembles an exporting firm based in America. Without trading barriers any
small positive deviation of we from wa will result in zero production of multinational firms
in Europe. Note that in the free-entry equilibrium the case of a multinational with just
one factory producing positive output levels will never occur. In fact, the multinational
would choose to become a national firm based in the country with lower factor prices.
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improve their relative competitiveness and gain ground at the expense of the
former. In an open economy setting, in which national firms based in both
countries compete with each other, increases in the wage rate in Europe will
therefore cause firms based in America to expand their production.
Finally, I am interested in the effect of increases in we on the production
of multinational enterprises for the American market. Multinationals are
again equivalent to national firms based in America that produce for the
domestic market only. There will be no effects on their output levels if
multinational enterprises only compete with other multinationals or with
national firms based in America. When competing with exporters based in
Europe their output levelsXmea andXmaa will be positively affected as described
in proposition 2.15
3.3.2 Effects of an Increase in the European Wage on
Potential Profits
Up to this point, I have taken the number of firms in the market as given.
However, changes in the minimum wage will not only alter the behaviour of
active firms but also determine which types of firms enter the market. The
decision is governed by free entry conditions. In this section, I will briefly look
at the effects of an increase in the wage rate of Europe on potential profits
of the four types of firms keeping all other endogenous variables constant.
Using equations (3.14) - (3.18), the free entry conditions can be re-written
as:
Πne =β
Me
(
pe − wec
pe
)2
+Ma
(
pa − we(c+ t)
pa
)2
− we(G+ F ) ≤ 0, (ne ≥ 0), (3.32)
Πna =β
Me
(
pe − wa(c+ t)
pe
)2
+Ma
(
pa − wac
pa
)2
− wa(G+ F ) ≤ 0, (na ≥ 0), (3.33)
Πme =β
Me
(
pe − wec
pe
)2
+Ma
(
pa − wac
pa
)2
− we(G+ F )− waG ≤ 0, (me ≥ 0), (3.34)
15Whenever European wages are such that wec > wa(c+t) the multinational would shift
all its production to its American factory and therefore will be similar to an American
exporter in terms of production patterns.
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Πma =β
Me
(
pe − wec
pe
)2
+Ma
(
pa − wac
pa
)2
− wa(G+ F )− weG ≤ 0, (ma ≥ 0). (3.35)
Now consider an increase in the European minimum wage. It is easy to see
that we have the following result
∆Πne < ∆Πme < ∆Πma < ∆Πna = 0. (3.36)
This finding suggests that national firms based in Europe will suffer most
from an increase in the (implicit) minimum wage. Not only their marginal
production costs but also their fixed costs for headquarters and factories will
increase. Multinational firms headquartered in Europe are less affected as
they produce their output for the American market in America. Multination-
als based in America have the additional advantage that fixed costs for their
headquarters do not depend on we. Finally, potential profits of American
exporters are not at all affected by the change. Hence, altering the minimum
wage in Europe will harm firms based in Europe most and is likely to give
rise to an equilibrium with heavy weight placed on firms based in Amer-
ica. Importantly, those firms most beneficial for Europe in terms of labour
demand are affected most severely.
3.4 The Numerical General Equilibrium
In this section I compute numerically the general equilibrium of the model.16
As in Markusen and Venables (1998) the benchmark simulation sets trading
costs t at 0.15.17 Countries have identical endowment levels of La = Le =
150 and Ra = Re = 50. Thus, labour regulations are the only source of
heterogeneity. The fixed costs of multinational enterprises are 1.45 times the
fixed costs of national firms when factor prices are equalised, α equals 3/8,
β is 2/3.18 The European wage rate is set initially so that it equals the free
16The numerical calculations are conducted using the MCP solver of GAMS.
17Only the benchmark simulation is presented in the following. Increasing the level of
trading barriers lowers the degree of openness of an economy. The results derived in the
full-fledged model setting then more and more resembles those derived in a closed economy
setting. See Appendix B.3 for more details on the role of trading barriers. Note also that
positive trading barriers are a necessary prerequisite for multinational firms to occur in
equilibrium.
18The values of α and β are chosen so that the X sector plays a dominant role in de-
termining labour demand in the two economies but the qualitative results are not affected
by the choice of the parameters.
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market equilibrium (we = 0.6). In order to study the effect of a one-sided
minimum wage in Europe the level of we is then successively increased.
The effects of the full-fledged model are contrasted with those derived
from a model without multinational firms and those derived in a closed-
economy setting. For doing so, three different versions of the model are
simulated. First, exporters and multinationals are suppressed, reducing the
model essentially to a closed economy setting. Second, firms are allowed to
export but multinational firms are still suppressed.19 Third, both exporting
firms and multinational firms are allowed to arise endogenously. Note that
the different versions of the model do not specify which type of firm will arise
endogenously but only restrict the range of possible firm types. There are
also no limitations on the location of the headquarters i.e. the respective
firm type might not arise in either country, only in one or in both countries.
Furthermore, the term ‘closed economy’ refers to the X sector only. The
numeraire good is freely traded in all three settings.
The numerical simulation serves primarily to establish qualitative results
and to assess the relative magnitudes of the effects across the three set-
tings. Quantitative impacts should be interpreted with some caution given
the simplifying features of the model. For instance, in reality implicit mini-
mum wages bind only for a fraction of workers. Hence, the quantitative effect
of the wage floor on overall unemployment rates is likely to be overstated.
Since the same simplifications are present in all three model versions, relative
magnitudes should nevertheless have explanatory power.
Table 3.1 provides an overview of the firms actually active in equilib-
rium over the parameter space we ∈ [0.60, 0.85] and listed separately for the
three different model settings. Positive numbers of national and multina-
tional firms headquartered in country i = a, e are indicated by ni and mi,
respectively.20 In the closed economy domestic firms do not face foreign com-
petition and will prevail in both countries over the entire parameter space.
With intra-industry trade, firms located in America will constantly gain in
terms of relative competitiveness, and domestic firms based in Europe will
altogether quit the market at a minimum wage of 0.81. Without imposing
restrictions on the firm types the initial equilibrium is characterised by coex-
isting multinational firms. The figure shows that a relatively small increase
in European wages is sufficient for all multinational firms based in Europe
to displace their headquarters to America. Further increases in we bene-
fit national firms based in America which are the only type of firms whose
19In the absence of any labour market frictions the model would then essentially reduce
to a two-factor version of Brander and Krugman (1983) and Venables (1985).
20As in Markusen (2002) a firm type is ignored when there are less than 0.3 firms in
equilibrium.
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we Closed Economy Exporters only Exporters and MNEs
0.60
ne,na
ne,na
me,ma
0.61
0.62
0.63
0.64
0.65
ma
0.66
0.67
0.68
0.69
ma,na
0.70
0.71
0.72
0.73
0.74 me,ma,na
0.75
me,na
0.76
0.77
0.78
0.79
0.80
0.81
na
0.82
na
0.83
0.84
0.85
Table 3.1: Type(s) of Firms Active in Equilibrium
costs are not affected by European wages. Consequently, for very high levels
of we multinational firms are no longer profitable and American exporters
will be left as the only type of firm active in equilibrium. Interestingly, for
0.74 ≤ we ≤ 0.81 multinationals relocate from America to Europe – a finding
explained later in this section.
Consider now the effect of an increase in we on the level of unemploy-
ment in Europe as depicted in Figure 3.1. Clearly, unemployment is on the
rise for all three simulations. The closed economy setting provides a lower
bound to the other specifications. Once firms are allowed to export, the
effect of one-sided downward wage rigidity on the unemployment rate is sig-
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Figure 3.1: Effect of a European Minimum Wage on European Unemploy-
ment
nificantly larger. One can also turn the result upside-down. A move from
autarky to an open economy will increase European unemployment. The
simulation shows that the calculated unemployment rate is more than twice
as high over the complete parameter space. Firms based in America pro-
duce ever-larger shares of European consumption thereby reducing demand
for European labour. In general equilibrium, higher unemployment rates
also cause income levels in Europe to fall more rapidly compared to a closed
economy setting (see Figure 3.2). Market size and production decline even
further.
Interestingly, the existence of multinational enterprises dampens the neg-
ative effects of the minimum wage over some range of the parameter space.21
With MNEs a larger share of production remains in Europe. Multinationals
are less affected by changes in we than European exporters as parts of their
(marginal and fixed) costs depend on American factor prices only. Thus, they
21Note that the observed dampening effect of multinational enterprises is only evident
in a setting, in which trading barriers are low enough for intra-industry trade to occur.
If trading barriers are prohibitively high, the open economy setting with exporting firms
will effectively reflect a closed economy. Adding multinational firms to such a scenario
will raise the actual unemployment rate because multinational firms will relocate their
headquarters to the country with lower factor prices.
46
60
70
80
90
100
110
120
M
e
20
30
40
50
we
Closed Economy Exporters Only Exporters and MNEs
Figure 3.2: Effect of a European Minimum Wage on the European Income
Level
are able to compete with American exporters for a wider range of values of
the minimum wage. As long as multinationals are present in the market, a
fraction of domestic consumption of X is still produced in Europe. This is
illustrated in Figure 3.3 that also highlights that the sharp increase in unem-
ployment coincides with the fall in the fraction of XeC produced domestically.
With lower unemployment rates purchasing power in Europe initially declines
only moderately. Thus, in the presence of MNEs not only a higher fraction
of European consumption is met with domestic production. The European
market also remains more important in terms of its size relative to the Amer-
ican counterpart.22 Once all the production takes place in America, further
increases in we only affect Ue via the impact on Y production. Consequently,
the difference between the open and the closed economy setting will diminish
for larger values of we since in the former setting the domestic production of
X is still negatively affected by increases in we.
The effect that the introduction of a wage floor in Europe has for the
American wage level are illustrated in Figure 3.4. National labour market
22Figure B.3 in the Appendix depicts the fraction of worldwide X consumption produced
in Europe thereby also taking into account differences in the relative market sizes across
the different model settings.
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Figure 3.4: Effect of a European Minimum Wage on American Wages
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Figure 3.5: Effect of a European Minimum Wage on European Welfare
legislation introduced in Europe has no effect on the American labour mar-
ket in a closed economy. However, wage rigidity in Europe props up wages
in America when product markets are global. American firms gain a rela-
tive cost advantage vis-a-vis their competitors and expand production. This
raises labour demand and wages in America. As long as multinationals oper-
ate in the market, the effect is somewhat less pronounced in the unrestricted
setting since a lower fraction of the production for the American market is
transferred to America. After reaching a peak, the wage level in America is
decreasing in we. This is due to the fact that further wage increases in Europe
lead to additional unemployment and to income losses in Europe. Demand
for good X in Europe falls and so does production and labour demand in
America.
There is yet another interesting aspect evident from Figure 3.4. For a
certain parameter range the wage level is actually higher in America than
in Europe despite the (binding) minimum wage in the latter. How can such
an equilibrium be sustainable? The reason is a sort of home market effect.
While income levels in America are soaring,23 unemployment in Europe de-
presses local income and demand for X production. Therefore, national firms
23The effect of wages on income levels in America is depicted in Figure B.4 in the
Appendix.
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based in America serve a far larger domestic market than their counterparts
in Europe. And since national markets are somewhat shielded by trading
barriers, American national firms do have a competitive advantage despite
their higher marginal production costs.
In the presence of multinational enterprises, wages in America are higher
than in Europe for an implicit minimum wage of between 0.75 and 0.81. Note
that in this case there is a sudden shift backwards to multinationals based in
Europe, since MNEs based in different countries clearly do not have a home
market advantage in comparison to each other. Hence, multinationals will
always locate their headquarters in the country with lower factor prices.
Finally, a note on the welfare consequences of a national (one-sided) min-
imum wage. After the preceding analysis it is hardly surprising that intro-
ducing downward wage rigidity depresses consumption and hence welfare in
Europe. For a given minimum wage moving from a closed to an open econ-
omy setting actually lowers welfare. This is an interesting result in itself since
it shows that there might be a case for protectionism in the presence of one-
sided wage rigidities.24 The adverse welfare effects are somewhat dampened
when multinational firms are allowed to enter.
3.5 National Labour Supplies, Global Conse-
quences
In this section I study the effect of national factor supplies on the two labour
markets and, hence, the question of whether and how cross-county differences
in the evolution of labour supply affect cross-country wage trends.25
In line with Davis (1998a) the fixed European minimum wage insulates
America from any effects caused by factor accumulation in Europe. Figure
3.6 shows how American wages and European unemployment vary with Euro-
pean labour endowment. As long as the minimum wage binds, labour supply
has no effect on factor prices in Europe and additional labour endowment
will add to the European unemployment stock. Hence, the unemployment
rate is steeply increasing in Le. In contrast, the relative cost competitiveness
of American firms and American labour demand are not affected by factor
24Note that in the present model welfare gains from trade are rather limited even without
labour market imperfections. Hence, one cannot necessarily draw the conclusion that in
practice the overall welfare gain of globalisation is negative in the presence of (one-sided)
wage rigidities. The main point here is that moving from a closed to an open economy
may entail significant welfare losses (besides the well-known benefits).
25For the simulations the European wage rate is fixed at 0.65.
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Figure 3.6: Labour Market Consequences of an Increase in European Labour
Supply
accumulation in Europe. Therefore, the American wage rate is independent
of European factor supplies.
The effects of an increase in American labour supply, depicted in Figure
3.7, are more subtle. Initially, there is a parameter range, in which Ameri-
can wages do not respond to domestic labour supply and equal the (fixed)
wage in Europe. This result resembles the one of Davis (1998a) who finds
that differences in the accumulation of labour cannot explain divergent wage
trends. The parameter space corresponds to a regime of multinational firms
based in both countries. Increases in the American labour supply put down-
ward pressure on American wages. More and more multinationals move their
headquarters from Europe to America increasing labour demand in America
and decreasing it in Europe. This allows America to sustain its wage level
while European unemployment soars.
Once all multinationals have relocated to America further factor accumu-
lation leads to a decline in American wages. The number of multinationals
based in America increases only slightly and no additional labour demand is
generated from the relocation of headquarters. In this parameter space un-
employment in Europe is hardly affected by American factor accumulation.
It even falls somewhat as the (slightly) increasing number of multination-
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Figure 3.7: Labour Market Consequences of an Increase in American Labour
Supply
als based in America is accompanied by a (slight) increase of production in
Europe.
Further decreases in the American wage rate increase the competitiveness
of national American firms relative to their multinational competitors. As
soon as national firms enter the market, production of the X good starts
being relocated from Europe to America. This causes a surge in American
labour demand and depresses labour demand in Europe. Hence, American
wages and unemployment in Europe start to increase hand in hand. These
developments also change the relative size of the two markets and favour the
establishment of national firms based in America. Further factor accumu-
lation will lead to higher and higher American wages while unemployment
keeps on rising in Europe. The development comes to an end at the point
at which all the production of the X good takes place in America and only
national firms are left in the market. Further increases in American labour
supply will then again depress American wages.
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3.6 Conclusion
This paper has studied the effects of introducing a one-sided minimum wage
in a model of intra-industry trade and multinational firms. Even though fac-
tor prices do not equalise across countries, the overarching message of Davis
(1998a) is confirmed. National labour market regulations profoundly interact
and cannot be analysed in isolation when goods markets are global. It has
been shown that the adverse employment effects of an asymmetric minimum
wage are much more pronounced in an open economy setting with positive
intra-industry trade compared to a framework without exporters. Perhaps
surprisingly, multinational firms do not worsen but potentially mitigate the
effects somewhat. While there is no one-to-one relation between the Euro-
pean minimum wage and the wage rate in America as in (Davis, 1998a), a
(binding) wage floor in one country will prop up wages in the other. Ameri-
can wages can actually rise above the binding minimum wage rate in Europe
even though countries are otherwise identical.
The result illustrates why rigid institutions might have contributed sig-
nificantly to the European unemployment problem even though they were
already in place long before the problem actually occurred. Moving towards
a global world economy dramatically alters the outcome of labour market
rigidity. Consequently, wage flexibility appears to be of specific importance
for the labour market performance in open economies. This finding suggests
that labour market reforms should indeed be directed towards a higher degree
of (wage) flexibility in the face of global competition. Since moving from a
closed to an open economy setting depresses welfare in the rigid-wage coun-
try, there might also be a case for protectionism in the presence of one-sided
wage rigidities.
The interaction of national labour market institutions has also been il-
lustrated with respect to the effects of local factor accumulation on global
labour market outcomes. Factor accumulation in Europe has no effect on
American wages, which are protected by the binding European minimum
wage. Unemployment rates in Europe rise hand and hand with national
labour endowment. In contrast, the effects of an increase in the American
labour supply are more subtle. In fact, factor accumulation in America can
even increase American wages.
The model lends itself to a number of extensions. For instance, the effects
of labour market institutions – and (implicit) minimum wages in particular
– should differ across workers with different skill levels. A wage floor is cer-
tainly more likely to be binding for low-skilled than for high-skilled workers.
Hence, allowing for heterogeneous labour may enrich the predictions of the
model. The study has also abstracted from key elements that characterise
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the recent wave of economic integration. A central and novel feature that
has attracted a lot of academic and public attention has been the diffusion of
production stages across national boundaries. Furthermore, trade with de-
veloping countries such as China or India has soared. Adding these features
to the model may generate further important insights into the interaction of
national labour market regulations in a globalised world.
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Chapter 4
Unionisation Structures and
Heterogeneous Firms
Abstract. This paper studies how different unionisation structures affect firm
productivity and firm performance in a monopolistic competition model with
heterogeneous firms and free entry. While centralised bargaining induces
tougher selection among heterogeneous producers and thus increases average
productivity, firm-level bargaining allows less productive entrants to remain
in the market. Centralised bargaining also results in higher average output
and profit levels than either decentralised bargaining or a competitive labour
market. From the perspective of consumers, the choice between centralised
and decentralised bargaining involves a potential trade-off between product
variety and product prices. Extending the model to a two-country setup, I
furthermore show that the positive effect of centralised bargaining on aver-
age productivity can be overturned when firms face international low-wage
competition.
4.1 Introduction
Since the late 1970s, there has been a tendency among OECD countries to
grant greater flexibility in the determination of wages. In fact, nine out of
twenty-one member countries examined by the OECD (2004b)1 have allowed
wages to adjust more freely to local conditions at the firm level, while not
a single member country has moved to more centralised bargaining struc-
tures. In many European OECD countries, however, wages continue to be
1The OCED does not assess wage setting institutions in central and eastern European
OECD countries before the 1990s. Data on the bargaining level are also not provided for
Iceland, Luxembourg, Mexico, Turkey and South Korea.
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predominantly determined in industry-level collective agreements that spec-
ify a uniform wage rate common to all firms in an industry. This paper
examines how different bargaining structures affect firm productivity and
firm performance in the long run.
What unions do to productivity and firm performance has been the topic
of extensive research (cf. Metcalf, 2003; Hirsch, 2004, for recent surveys).
Conventional wisdom suggests that by raising pay unions hurt the financial
performance of firms – ‘unless there is a roughly equivalent union effect on
productivity’ (Metcalf, 2003, p. 118). The effect of unions on productiv-
ity is theoretically ambiguous. Higher wage payments can induce unionised
firms to increase the capital intensity of production, thereby increasing the
productivity of the remaining workforce. Most of the literature on the re-
lation between unionisation and productivity has focused on the incentives
of unionised firms to innovate. Early studies by Grout (1984) and Van der
Ploeg (1987) have pointed to a hold-up problem associated with unionisation.
Once a firm has incurred the sunk costs of investment, unions can capture
part of the innovation rent by demanding higher wages. The incentives of
firms to innovate are therefore decreasing in union bargaining power. If
firms, however, invest strategically so as to increase their market shares and
profits, unionised enterprises may enjoy a strategic advantage over their non-
unionised competitors (cf. Tauman and Weiss, 1987; Ulph and Ulph, 1994,
2001). Existing studies have not only focused mainly on firm-level bargain-
ing but have also concentrated on markets that are characterised by a small
and fixed number of firms. The market structure in these studies is exoge-
nously given. Unionisation, however, is likely to influence the number and,
equally important, the characteristics of firms that survive in the long-run;
and financial performance depends crucially on the market environment.
My objective in this paper is to analyse the interactions between bar-
gaining structures, the market environment and firm performance. To that
end, I study a monopolistic competition model in the spirit of Melitz and
Ottaviano (2008) with heterogeneous firms and free entry. The model in-
corporates both differences in firm productivity and endogenous mark-ups
that respond to the intensity of competition in a market. The intensity
of competition is summarised by the number of competing enterprises and
their average price level. I distinguish between three different labour mar-
ket regimes. Wages are either determined in a perfectly competitive labour
market, set by firm-specific unions, or fixed by a binding, sector-wide wage
agreement. With decentralised bargaining, wages are firm-specific and in-
crease in productivity. With sector-level bargaining, in contrast, wages are
uniform, a singular wage rate that is binding for each and every firm.
The model highlights two effects of unionisation that have been largely
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overlooked in previous work. First, sector-level bargaining (but not firm-level
bargaining) induces tougher selection among heterogeneous producers and
changes the productivity distribution among surviving firms. In particular,
by increasing wages for all firms, centralised bargaining acts a barrier to entry
for low-productivity firms. Second, both bargaining regimes discourage entry
and decrease competitive pressures by raising pay. Less intensive competition
ceteris paribus results in higher profits of surviving firms and allows less
productive enterprises to remain in the market.
Compared to the competitive benchmark, centralised bargaining increases
average productivity (due to the selection effect) and boosts average output
and profits (due to a combination of the selection and the anti-competitive
effect). Firm-level bargaining, in contrast, by allowing less productive firms
to survive, decreases average firm productivity and performance. At the level
of the individual firm, unionisation creates winners and losers. Decentralised
agreements benefit low-productivity firms and harm high-productivity firms,
while the opposite is true for centralised wage agreements. Moreover, the
paper demonstrates that – from a consumer’s perspective – the choice be-
tween the two bargaining regimes can involve a trade-off between product
prices and product variety. Firm-level bargaining tends to increase product
variety but also induces a less favourable price distribution than centralised
bargaining does.
My result that wage compression can be beneficial for productivity is
related to earlier work by Moene and Wallerstein (1997). Formalising ar-
guments made in the Swedish debate over ‘solidaristic’ bargaining (Rehn,
1952), Moene and Wallerstein (1997) compare the effects of decentralised
and centralised wage bargaining in a vintage capital model of a small open
economy in which the price of output is exogenously given. Firms decide
when to open new, more productive plants and when to shut down older,
less productive ones. Under decentralised bargaining, less productive plants
pay lower wages and can therefore remain in the market for a longer time.
Centralised bargaining, in contrast, levels interplant wage differentials and
drives less productive plants out of the market. Apart from the very different
modeling strategy, the principal difference between Moene and Wallerstein
(1997) and the present paper is my focus on the intensity of competition as
an additional channel through which unionisation can influence productiv-
ity and firm performance.2 The effects of different unionisation structures
on firm productivity are also examined by Haucap and Wey (2004) who
2The present paper also shows that the choice between centralised and decentralised
bargaining involves a trade-off between product prices and product variety. In Moene and
Wallerstein (1997), in contrast, output prices are exogenously given.
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find that centralised bargaining provides the greatest incentives to innovate.
They develop their argument in an unionised oligopoly model with a fixed
number of firms and focus on the interaction between bargaining structures
and the hold-up problem associated with unionisation. In contrast to their
paper, I take a long-run perspective and examine how different unionisation
structures affect firm performance in a model with an endogenous market
structure.
Extending the model to a two-country setup, I furthermore show that
the positive effect centralised bargaining has on average productivity may
vanish when firms face international low-wage competition. While both the
selection and the anti-competitive effects are still at work in an open economy,
collective bargaining, by increasing wages, also induces firms to relocate to
the non-unionised country. In such a setting, trade liberalisation can reduce
competition and harm productivity in the high-wage country.
The paper is structured as follows: Section 4.2 presents the basic model
setting which I then use in Section 4.3 to analyse the effects of unionisation
structures on firm productivity and firm performance. Section 4.4 studies the
impact of wage bargaining on product variety and product prices. Section
4.5 discusses the implications of collective bargaining in an open economy.
Section 4.6 summarises the main findings and concludes.
4.2 The Model Setting
I consider a two-sector economy with a representative consumer that inelas-
tically supplies L units of labour.3
4.2.1 Preferences and Demand
Preferences of the representative consumer are given by a quasilinear utility
function defined over a continuum of differentiated varieties and a homoge-
neous numeraire good:
U = qc0 + α
∫
i∈Ω
qcidi−
1
2γ
∫
i∈Ω
(qci )2di−
1
2η
(∫
i∈Ω
qcidi
)2
, (4.1)
where qc0 and qci are the consumption levels of the numeraire good and of
variety i ∈ Ω, respectively. The parameters α > 0, η > 0 determine demand
for the differentiated varieties relative to the numeraire good, while γ >
0 is an (inverse) measure of the degree of product differentiation between
3The model framework is similar to Melitz and Ottaviano (2008) but in addition to
their work I study the effects of firm- and sector-level bargaining.
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varieties. In the limit, as γ approaches 0, varieties become perfect substitutes
and the consumer is only concerned about the total consumption level over
all varieties, Qc =
∫
i∈Ω q
c
idi. Increases in α and decreases in η both boost
demand for the differentiated varieties relative to the numeraire.
The representative consumer maximises (4.1) subject to her budget con-
straint. Let Ω∗ ⊂ Ω be the subset of varieties that are actually consumed
(qci > 0). The constraint can then be written as
I = qc0 +
∫
i∈Ω∗
piq
c
idi, (4.2)
where I represents income, pi is the price of variety i, and the price of the
numeraire good has been normalised to unity. Provided that the representa-
tive consumer has positive demand for the numeraire, utility maximisation
yields the following inverse demand function for each consumed variety i:
pi = α− γqci − ηQc. (4.3)
Let N measure the number of consumed varieties in Ω∗. By inverting (4.3),
demand for these varieties can be expressed as follows:
qi =
α
ηN + γ −
1
γ
pi +
ηN
ηN + γ
1
γ
p, ∀i ∈ Ω∗, (4.4)
where p = (1/N)
∫
i∈Ω∗ pidi is the average price of all consumed varieties.
With quasi-linear preferences all income effects are swept up by the nu-
meraire good and qi is independent of I. Therefore, admittedly, the model
has a strong partial equilibrium flavour. However, the price elasticity of de-
mand derived from a quasi-linear utility function has the considerable merit
that it is not fixed as in the case of Constant Elasticity of Substitution (CES)
preferences but related to the intensity of competition. In fact, the price elas-
ticity i ≡ | ∂qi∂pi
pi
qi
| = [(pmax/pi) − 1]−1 is inversely related to the upper price
bound pmax, at which demand for a variety i is driven down to zero (i.e.
qi(pmax) = 0). The price bound is a summary statistic for the ‘toughness’ of
competition and given by
pmax ≡ 1
ηN + γ (γα + ηNp), (4.5)
which from (4.3) has to be smaller than α. The upper bound on prices is de-
creasing in the number of competing enterprises and increasing in the average
price level. In line with the empirical evidence (see, for instance, Campbell
and Hopenhayn, 2005, and Tybout, 2003), an increase in the intensity of
competition, as indicated by a lower price bound, thus increases the price
elasticity of demand i at any given pi.
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4.2.2 Production, Firm Behaviour and Entry
The numeraire good is sold in a perfectly competitive market and produced
under constant returns to scale. One unit of labour is required to produce
one unit of the numeraire. As the price of the numeraire is normalised to
one, this implies a wage rate of unity in the numeraire good sector.
In the differentiated product sector entry is costly. I take a long-run per-
spective and assume that there exists a large (unbounded) pool of prospective
entrants.4 In order to enter the market, firms have to incur fixed start-up
costs of fE. Unit costs of production are given by cw(c) with c denoting unit
labour requirement and w(c) being the (potentially firm-specific) wage rate.
Prior to entry the cost level c of a firm is unknown and each start-up learns
its cost level only after it has made the initial investment. The cost level is
drawn from a common and known distribution G(c) with support on [0, cM ].
Following Melitz and Ottaviano (2008), I assume that the productivity draw
1/c follows a Pareto distribution with shape parameter k ≥ 1.5 Accordingly,
the distribution of cost draws G(c) is given by
G(c) =
(
c
cM
)k
, c ∈ [0, cM ]. (4.6)
The shape parameter k determines the dispersion of cost draws. For k = 1
the latter is uniformly distributed on the support. As k increases, the relative
frequency of start-ups with high cost levels increases as well.
After a firm has drawn its productivity parameter c it decides whether to
remain in the market and to start production. A firm will do so whenever
it can cover its marginal costs and earn non-negative (gross) profits. All
other entrants leave the market. Surviving firms then maximise their profits
Π(c) = [p(c) − cw(c)]q(c) taking the number of firms in the market and
the average price level as given. Using the demand function in (4.4), the
first-order condition of a firm with cost draw c reads
q(c) = 1
γ
[p(c)− cw(c)]. (4.7)
By solving equation (4.4) for the price level, substituting into (4.7) and also
using the definition of pmax the profit-maximising price p(c) can be written
4A short-run version of the model could be constructed by considering a fixed number
of incumbents only (cf. Melitz and Ottaviano, 2008).
5Using firm-level data for manufacturing industries in 11 EU countries, Del Gatto et al.
(2006) provide evidence that the Pareto is a good approximation to the distribution of
firm productivity across sectors and countries. They suggest that on average the shape
parameter k is close to two.
Chapter 4. Unionisation Structures 61
as
p(c) = 12 [pmax + cw(c)] . (4.8)
Hence, the price level does not only increase with unit costs cw(c), it is also
(inversely) related to the endogenous degree of competitiveness in the market.
The profit-maximising output level q(c), the corresponding profit level Π(c)
and the markup µ(c) = p(c)− cw(c) of a firm can also be expressed in terms
of cw(c) and pmax only:
q(c) = 12γ [pmax − cw(c)] , (4.9)
Π(c) = 14γ [pmax − cw(c)]
2 , (4.10)
µ(c) = 12 [pmax − cw(c)] . (4.11)
Now let cmax reference the cost level of a firm that just earns zero gross
profits. This firm’s profit-maximising price level is driven down to its mar-
ginal cost and the firm is therefore just indifferent about remaining in the
market. All firms with c < cmax are sufficiently productive to earn positive
gross profits and therefore stay in the market and start production. In con-
trast, firms with cost levels above cmax exit.6 From (4.10) one can directly
infer that
cmax =
pmax
w(cmax)
. (4.12)
The cut-off level is therefore negatively related to the wage rate of the
marginal firm but positively associated with the (endogenous) upper price
bound pmax. Strong competitive pressures thus deter entry of low-produc-
tivity firms.
Prior to entry, i.e. before a prospective entrant has undertaken its initial
investment, expected gross profits are given by
∫ cmax
0 Π(c)dG(c). Unrestricted
entry ensures that expected gross profits are driven down to the fixed start-up
cost fE and hence total expected profits are driven down to zero. Accordingly,
the free-entry equilibrium condition is given by∫ cmax
0
Π(c)dG(c) = fE. (4.13)
6I will assume in the following that cmax is below cM and hence firms with a cost draw
of between cmax and cM have to leave the market.
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4.2.3 Labor Market Regimes
Wages in the differentiated good sector can either be determined in a perfectly
competitive labour market, fixed by an industry-wide wage agreement, or set
by a firm-specific union. These three different scenarios ρ = P,U,D have the
following properties:
1. Competitive Labour Market (ρ = P ).7 Wages in the differentiated good
sector just equal the outside option of workers. The latter is determined
by the wage rate in the competitive numeraire sector and equals unity.
Therefore, in a flexible labour market the corresponding wage rate wP
is given by w = 1.
2. Centralised Bargaining (ρ = U). An industry union sets an uniform
industry-wide wage floor above the competitive wage rate. The wage
is given by wU = θw = θ with θ > 1.
3. Decentralised Bargaining (ρ = D). Union activities are specific to a
firm. In particular, there exist N firm-level unions and each union sets
a wage rate for its respective firm. In doing so, unions maximise total
firm-level rents [w(c) − w]E(c), where firm-level employment E(c) is
given by cq(c). Solving the maximisation problem then yields a firm-
specific wage rate of wD(c) = (pmax + c)/2c.8
Centralised and decentralised wage bargaining differ in one key character-
istic that is crucial for the results to follow. While firm-level bargaining
accounts for idiosyncratic firm characteristics, an industry-wide bargaining
agreement specifies a uniform wage that is binding for each and every firm.
More specifically, under firm-level bargaining the wage rate is increasing in
firm productivity (or decreasing in the cost level c). In contrast, the wage
rate under centralised wage bargaining is independent from productivity and
has to be paid by any firm in the differentiated product sector. In fact,
centralised bargaining agreements are frequently criticised for suppressing
regional or plant-specific wage differentials. Although the uniform wage rate
wU could in principle be derived endogenously, e.g., from a simple monopoly
union model, a binding and exogenously given wage θ > 1 is the simplest
and most flexible way to model this characteristic in the present context.9
7This case has been analysed by Melitz and Ottaviano (2008).
8Here I also assume that the bargaining takes place after the entry decision has been
made and that firms retain their right-to-manage.
9In order to derive a closed form solution for wU from a monopoly union model, one
has to assume that the industry-level union does not take into account its influence on
pmax. Introducing the free parameter θ will furthermore prove helpful in the following as
some of the results depend on the exact level of the binding wage floor.
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A possible parameter value of θ is the average wage rate received by work-
ers under decentralised bargaining. Of course, as modelled here, the uniform
wage rate wU > w could also result from a (binding) minimum wage imposed
by the state.
4.3 Productivity and Firm Performance
In this section I use the model described above to analyse the effect of the
different labour market regimes on average firm productivity and firm perfor-
mance. To build intuition, I start with treating the market structure in the
differentiated good sector, as summarised by pmax, as exogenously given. By
substituting the corresponding wage rate into equation (4.12) the cost cut-off
level cρmax under each labour market regime ρ = P,U,D can be written as
cPmax = pPmax, cUmax =
pUmax
θ
, cDmax = pDmax. (4.14)
Inspecting equations (4.14) shows that for any exogenously given pρmax =
pmax (∀ρ = P,U,D) the cost cut-off level is lowest under centralised wage
bargaining. Centralised bargaining induces tougher selection by increasing
marginal production costs of all firms. Entry of low-productivity enterprises
is thus deterred. I call this the selection effect of centralised bargaining. With
firm-level bargaining, in contrast, wages are firm-specific. Less productive
firms have to pay lower wages and the marginal firm just pays the competitive
unit wage wD(cmax) = 110. Consequently, the selection effect is absent under
firm-level bargaining; for any given pmax the cost cut-offs cPmax and cUmax are
identical. Notice that this result is not specific to the monopoly union model
but follows from any model of union behaviour that yields w(cmax) = w.
Consider next the profit level of a firm producing with cost c under labour
market regime ρ = P,U,D:
ΠP (c) = 14γ (p
P
max − c)2, ΠU(c) =
1
4γ (p
U
max − cθ)2,
ΠD(c) = 116γ (p
D
max − c)2. (4.15)
Given an exogenous level of competition, profits of a firm with cost draw c
are highest in the competitive environment. By increasing wages above the
competitive level, both centralised and decentralised wage bargaining ceteris
10Evaluating wD(c) at c = cmax yields pmax/2cmax+1/2. From cmax = pmax/w(cmax),
it then follows that wD(cmax) = 1.
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paribus depress profits.11 Whether a firm is better off under firm- or under
sector-level bargaining depends on its cost draw c. Firms with a cost level of
above pmax/(2θ − 1) prefer the decentralised over the centralised bargaining
mode. High-productivity firms, in contrast, are better off under a uniform
wage agreement.
So far I have taken pmax as exogenously given. In equilibrium, the cost
cut-off level cmax and the corresponding upper price bound pmax are deter-
mined by the free entry condition (4.13). Using equations (4.14) and (4.15),
the free entry condition for labour market regime ρ = P,U,D can be rewrit-
ten as∫ cPmax
0
1
4γ (c
P
max − c)2dG(c) = fE,
∫ cUmax
0
θ2
4γ (c
U
max − c)2dG(c) = fE,∫ cDmax
0
1
16γ (c
D
max − c)2dG(c) = fE. (4.16)
The equilibrium cost cut-off levels and upper price bounds are then given
by:12
cPmax = pPmax =
[
2(k + 1)(k + 2)γ(cM)kfE
]1/(k+2)
, (4.17)
cUmax =
pUmax
θ
=
[ 1
θ2
]1/(k+2) [
2(k + 1)(k + 2)γ(cM)kfE
]1/(k+2)
, (4.18)
cDmax = pDmax = 41/(k+2)
[
2(k + 1)(k + 2)γ(cM)kfE
]1/(k+2)
. (4.19)
Comparing these cut-off levels and price bounds yields
Proposition 1. The orderings of the cost cut-off levels, cρmax, and the upper
price bounds, pρmax, under the different labour market regimes ρ = P,U,D
are as follows:
i. cDmax > cPmax > cUmax,
ii. pPmax < min [pUmax, pDmax],
iii. pUmax > (<) pDmax for θk > (<) 4.
11The marginal firm under decentralised wage bargaining is an exception in this regard
because it just has to pay the competitive wage rate.
12These cut-off levels are derived under the assumption that cρmax < cM . For the
different labour market regimes ρ = P,U,D this assumption is fulfilled for cM >√
2(k + 1)(k + 2)γfE , cM > (1/θ)
√
2(k + 1)(k + 2)γfE , cM > 2
√
2(k + 1)(k + 2)γfE ,
respectively.
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The equilibrium cost cut-off is thus lowest under centralised bargaining
and highest under firm-level bargaining. The overall intensity of competition
is highest (the upper price bound is lowest) in the competitive environment.
These two findings are directly related to our previous observations that for
any given market structure centralised bargaining induces tougher selection
and both bargaining regimes reduce profits.
The selection effect of centralised bargaining drives the least efficient
firms out of the market and therefore decreases the cost cut-off. At the
same time, by decreasing expected profits of potential entrants,13 centralised
bargaining also discourages firm entry and thus reduces the ‘toughness’ of
competition. Since tougher competition also induces tougher selection, the
anti-competitive effect works against but does not overturn the selection ef-
fect. Firm-level bargaining, in contrast, does not induce tougher selection
but ceteris paribus only decreases expected profits of surviving firms. Lower
expected profits again discourage entry and reduce the intensity of compe-
tition. Firms can then charge higher equilibrium prices and entrants with
a relatively high cost level that would not break-even in a perfectly com-
petitive environment (let alone under centralised bargaining) remain in the
market. Finally, comparing the ‘toughness’ of competition under centralised
and decentralised wage bargaining shows that the upper price bound is higher
under the former if and only if θk > 4. Competition is therefore weaker un-
der regime U when the specified wage floor θ is relatively high and/or the
distribution of cost draws is skewed towards less productive firms.
Having endogenised the market structure (as summarised by pmax), I will
now assess how the different labour market regimes affect firm-level perfor-
mance. The (unweighted) average of some performance measure zρ(c) under
regime ρ = P,U,D is given by zρ =
[∫ cρmax
0 z
ρdG(c)
]
/G(cρmax). The firm-level
cost average cρ, average output qρ, and the average profit level Πρ can all be
written as simple functions of cρmax and pρmax only:
cP = k
k + 1c
P
max, c
U = k
k + 1c
U
max, c
D = k
k + 1c
D
max, (4.20)
qP = p
P
max
2γ(k + 1) , q
U = p
U
max
2γ(k + 1) , q
D = p
D
max
4γ(k + 1) , (4.21)
ΠP = (p
P
max)2
2γ(k + 1)(k + 2) , Π
U = (p
U
max)2
2γ(k + 1)(k + 2) ,
ΠD = (p
D
max)2
8γ(k + 1)(k + 2) . (4.22)
13Centralised bargaining does not only decrease expected profits by increasing pay but
also by reducing the ex-ante probability of survival for potential entrants.
66
Combining these performance measures with equations (4.17) to (4.19) yields
Proposition 2. The orderings of the firm-level cost averages, cρ, the average
output levels, qρ, and the average profit levels, Πρ, under the different labour
market regimes ρ = P,U,D are as follows:
i. cD > cP > cU ,
ii. qU > qP > qD,
iii. ΠU > ΠP > ΠD.
Compared to both the competitive environment and to firm-level bargain-
ing a uniform wage above the competitive level boosts average firm produc-
tivity (lowers the cost average), and leads to an increase in average output
and profits. The positive impact on average productivity follows directly
from the lower cost cut-off level (cf. Proposition 1i.). Two distinct effects are
responsible for the positive effect on average output and profits. First, the
productivity-enhancing effect of centralised wage bargaining also increases
average output and profits because high-productivity firms generally pro-
duce and earn more. Second, at the level of the individual firm, the anti-
competitive effect of centralised bargaining enables firms to charge higher
mark-ups, expand their production and increase their profits. Despite the
higher wage rate associated with unionisation, equilibrium profits of highly
productive firms are then higher under sector-level bargaining than they are
in a flexible-wage economy. For less productive firms, in contrast, the nega-
tive direct effect of higher wages on profits prevails.14
In stark contrast to these results, firm-level bargaining reduces average
productivity and decreases average output and profits. Firm-level bargain-
ing allows entrants with relatively unfavourable cost draws to remain in the
market. Since low-productivity firms tend to be small and less profitable,
the negative effect on average productivity also reduces average output and
profits. The individual firm can again benefit or lose from firm-level bargain-
ing. While enterprises have to pay higher wages compared to the competitive
benchmark (with the marginal firm being the exception), surviving firms ben-
efit from the lower equilibrium level of competition. Since firm-specific wages
are increasing in productivity, less productive enterprises benefit from firm-
level bargaining while more productive firms are hurt.15 Decentralised wage
14Calculating and comparing equilibrium profits under the different labour market
regimes show that gross profits of firms with c < [θk/(k+2) − 1]cPmax/(θ − 1) are higher
under centralised bargaining than they are in a competitive labour market regime.
15The positive (anti-competitive) effect of decentralised bargaining on output and profits
dominates for firms with c > [2− 41/(k+2)]cPmax.
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agreements thus benefit low-productivity firms and harm high-productivity
firms, while the opposite is true for centralised wage agreements.
4.4 Product Prices and Product Variety
After the previous section has studied the effects of different bargaining struc-
tures on productivity and firm performance, this section considers the effect
on two outcomes that are of central importance to consumers: product prices
and product variety.16
Consider first the distribution of prices. Using the appropriate wage rate,
the profit-maximising price of a variety produced with cost c under labour
market regime ρ = P,U,D can be written as:
pP (c) = 12
(
pPmax + c
)
, pU(c) = 12
(
pUmax + cθ
)
,
pD(c) = 12
(
3/2pDmax + 1/2c
)
. (4.24)
The corresponding average price level pρ is given by
[∫ cρmax
0 p
ρ(c)dG(c)
]
/
G(cρmax), while the variance of prices (δρp)2 for each labour market regime
ρ can be calculated as
[∫ cρmax
0 (pρ(c)− pρ)2 dG(c)
]
/G(cρmax). Using equations
(4.14) and (4.24), I then obtain the following first and second moments of
the different price distributions:
16In fact, the indirect utility function associated with (4.1) is given by
U = IC + 12
(
η + γ
N
)−1
(α− p)2 + 12
N
γ
θ2p, (4.23)
where θ2p = (1/N)
∫
i∈Ω∗ (pi − p)2 di is the variance of prices. Utility of the representative
consumer is thus decreasing in the average price level p and increasing in the variance of
prices θ2p, in product variety N and in income IC . While the model is well equipped for
analysing product prices and variety in the differentiated good sector, it is less appropri-
ate for studying the income effects of unionisation. Not only does the model postulate a
constant marginal utility of income, it also abstracts from economy-wide unemployment.
Units of labour not demanded by firms in the differentiated good sector are employed
in the numeraire sector. Since union bargaining therefore raises pay but does not cre-
ate unemployment, unionisation increases income by construction. I thus refrain from
analysing overall consumer welfare, and only consider product prices and product variety.
A complete consumer welfare analysis (with endogenous income) is relegated to Appendix
C.1.
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pP = 2k + 12(k + 1)p
P
max, p
U = 2k + 12(k + 1)p
U
max, p
D = 4k + 34(k + 1)p
D
max, (4.25)
(δPp )2 =
k(pPmax)2
4(k + 1)2(k + 2) , (δ
U
p )2 =
k(pUmax)2
4(k + 1)2(k + 2) ,
(δDp )2 =
k(pDmax)2
16(k + 1)2(k + 2) . (4.26)
Given the equilibrium upper price bounds in equations (4.17) to (4.19), these
moments can be ordered as follows:
Proposition 3. The orderings of the average price levels, pρ, and the vari-
ances of prices, (δρp)2, under the different labour market regimes ρ = P,U,D
are as follows:
i. pP < min
(
pU , pD
)
,
ii. pU < (>) pD for θk < (>) 4κ with κ = [(4k + 3)/(4k + 2)]k+2 > 1,
iii. (δUp )2 > (δPp )2 > (δDp )2.
The average price level is lowest in a flexible-wage economy. There are
three reasons why the average price level in a flexible-wage economy differs
from the mean of prices under centralised wage bargaining. First, a binding
sector-wide wage floor increases unit costs cw. Second, centralised bargain-
ing also decreases competition in equilibrium. Both factors increase ceteris
paribus the profit-maximising price of a firm producing with cost c. The
selection effect, in contrast, reduces the average price level because it sin-
gles out the more productive and thus cheaper firms. Equations (4.25) show
that for any given upper price bound pPmax = pUmax = pmax average prices
under the two regimes P and U are exactly identical. The direct effect on
unit costs and the selection effect of centralised wage bargaining hence cancel
out. Therefore, the anti-competitive effect of unionisation prevails and pU
strictly exceeds pP in equilibrium.
Firm-level bargaining also boosts pay and impedes competition (com-
pared to the competitive benchmark) but does not induce tougher selection.
As a result, the average price level is larger under decentralised bargaining
than with a perfectly competitive labour market even when we abstract from
any anti-competitive effect and take pmax as exogenously given. It then also
follows that for θk = 4 (and hence for pUmax = pDmax) pU is strictly lower
than pD. The average price level thus tends to be smaller under centralised
than under decentralised bargaining, because the former regime singles out
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more productive firms while the latter does not. Only for large θ, when the
intensity of competition under centralised bargaining is very weak, can the
ordering of pU and pD be reversed.
Finally, part iii of proposition 3 shows that the variance of prices is largest
under centralised wage bargaining and lowest under firm-level bargaining.
Compared to the flexible labour market regime, centralised wage bargain-
ing increases the average price level and thus the corresponding variance
increases as well. Firm-level bargaining, in contrast, reduces the variance of
prices. Since firm-specific wages increase in productivity, firm-level bargain-
ing compresses the distribution of marginal production costs cw(c). Prices
charged by individual firms therefore depend little on idiosyncratic cost draws
but are primarily determined by the overall market structure that is common
to all firms (see equation 4.24). Firms with different cost levels therefore set
relatively similar prices and the price variance decreases.
Consider next product variety. Using (4.25), equation (4.5) can be solved
for the number of firms in equilibrium and thus for the number of varieties
consumed:
NP = 2(k + 1)γ
η
α− pPmax
pPmax
, NU = 2(k + 1)γ
η
α− pUmax
pUmax
,
ND = 4(k + 1)γ
η
α− pDmax
pDmax
. (4.27)
Equations (4.27) reveal two factors that are of interest for the ordering of
product variety under the different labour market regimes. First, variety is
positively associated with the ‘toughness’ of competition. Second, for any
given pmax the number of consumed varieties is largest with decentralised
wage bargaining. This second finding mirrors proposition 3, according to
which the average price level is highest under decentralised wage bargaining
(for any given pmax). A high-price environment allows relatively many firms
to survive and thus leads to greater product variety. Accounting for both
factors, product variety under the different labour market regimes can be
ordered as follows:
Proposition 4. The ordering of the number of consumed varieties, Nρ, un-
der the different labour market regimes ρ = P,U,D is as follows:
i. NP > NU ,
ii. NP > (<)ND for pPmax > (<) φα with 0 < φ = (2/41/(k+2) − 1) < 1,
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iii. ND > (<)NU for θk > (<) 4λ with λ =
[
α/(2α− 41/(k+2)pPmax)
]k+2
<
1.17
The number of consumed varieties is thus strictly larger in a flexible-
wage economy than under centralised wage bargaining, reflecting the anti-
competitive effect of the latter. Decentralised wage bargaining, in contrast,
can result in either more or less variety than a competitive labour market.
Strong demand for the differentiated varieties relative to the numeraire good
(high values of α) and a relatively large share of firms with an unfavourable
cost draw (high values of k) tend to increase ND relative to NP . Finally,
the ordering of product variety under decentralised and centralised wage
bargaining is ambiguous and depends on the choice of θ. For θk = 4 and
thus for pUmax = pDmax, however, ND strictly exceeds NU .
The choice between centralised and decentralised bargaining therefore
involves a potential trade-off between product prices and product variety.
Holding pmax constant, firm-level bargaining is associated with greater prod-
uct variety but also with relatively higher prices (and a lower price variance).
4.5 Trade Liberalisation
In this section I extend the model setup to a two-country setting and show
that the positive effect that centralised bargaining has on average productiv-
ity can be overturned when firms face international low-wage competition.18
4.5.1 The Open Economy Setting
Consider two countries, Home (H) and Foreign (F), that are identical except
for their labour market regimes. The representative consumer in both coun-
tries share the same preferences that result in the inverse demand function
in (4.3). National goods markets are segmented and firms incur per-unit ice-
berg trade costs, i.e. exporters have to ship t > 1 units of the good in order
for one unit to arrive at the export destination.
From equation (4.5) the upper price bound for positive demand in market
i = H,F , pimax, is given by
pimax =
1
ηN i + γ (γα + ηN
ipi), (4.28)
17λ < 1 follows from ND > 0 (which implies α− pDmax = α− 41/(k+2)pPmax > 0).
18In the Appendix C.2, I briefly show that with symmetric labour market regulations
the main results derived in the previous sections continue to hold in the open economy
setting.
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where N i is the total number of firms selling in market i and pi denotes their
average price level.
Since markets are segmented and marginal production costs are constant,
firms separately maximise their profits earned from domestic and export
activities. Let qiL(c) and qiX(c) denote the profit-maximising levels of output
sold respectively in the local and in the export market by a firm producing in
country i with cost c. The corresponding profit-maximising prices are piL(c)
and piX(c). Profits earned from domestic and export sales are then given by
ΠiL(c) =
[
piL(c)− cwi
]
qiL(c), (4.29)
ΠiX(c) =
[
piX(c)− ctwi
]
qiX(c), (4.30)
where wi is the wage rate in country i. The corresponding first-order condi-
tions read
qiL(c) =
1
γ
[
piL(c)− cwi
]
, (4.31)
qiX(c) =
1
γ
[
piX(c)− ctwi
]
. (4.32)
Using the demand system in (4.4), the profit-maximising price and output
choices then satisfy
piL(c) =
1
2
(
pimax + cwi
)
, piX(c) =
1
2
(
pjmax + ctwi
)
, (4.33)
qiL(c) =
1
2γ
(
pimax − cwi
)
, qiX(c) =
1
2γ
(
pjmax − ctwi
)
. (4.34)
These choices yield the following maximised profit levels:
ΠiL(c) =
1
4γ
(
pimax − cwi
)2
, (4.35)
ΠiX(c) =
1
4γ
(
pjmax − ctwi
)2
. (4.36)
A firm only chooses to sell in a market if it earns non-negative profits.
This leads to (separate) cost cut-off levels for either market. Let ciL and ciX
denote the upper cost bounds of country i’s firms for selling in the local and
in the export market, respectively. From equations (4.35) and (4.36) these
cut-offs must satisfy
ciL =
pimax
wi
, (4.37)
ciX =
pjmax
twi
. (4.38)
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Notice that the cut-off levels of local producers in i and exporters from j
to i are related through cjX = (wiciL)/(twj). Higher trade barriers make it
harder for exporters to break even relative to domestic firms. Cross-country
differences in the wage level can mitigate or amplify this effect.
As in the closed economy setting, each start-up has to make an initial
investment. Its cost level is then drawn from a common and known dis-
tribution. Unrestricted entry in both countries ensures that expected gross
profits, which consist of expected profits from domestic and export activi-
ties, are driven down to the fixed entry cost. In order to isolate the effect of
different labour market regulations, I assume that new entrants in Home and
Foreign draw their cost level from the same cost distribution G(c) = (c/cM)k
and have to pay the same fixed entry cost fE. The free entry condition for
country i can then be written as∫ ciL
0
ΠiL(c)dG(c) +
∫ ciX
0
ΠiX(c)dG(c) = fE. (4.39)
Finally, labour market regulations in Home and Foreign differ. For the
sake of brevity, I only consider one specific scenario: firms in Home are
subjected to centralised wage bargaining, while the labour market in Foreign
is perfectly competitive.19 The wage rate in Home therefore equals wH = θ
and is strictly above the unit wage that prevails in Foreign.
4.5.2 Trade Liberalisation and Productivity
I start with rewriting the upper cost bounds for both markets by substituting
the respective wage rate into (4.37) and (4.38):
cHL =
pHmax
θ
, cHX =
pFmax
tθ
, (4.40)
cFL = pFmax, cFX =
pHmax
t
. (4.41)
Likewise, profits from domestic and exporting activities of firms located in
Home and Foreign, respectively, can be written as
ΠHL (c) =
1
4γ
(
pHmax − cθ
)2
, ΠHX(c) =
1
4γ
(
pFmax − ctθ
)2
, (4.42)
ΠFL(c) =
1
4γ
(
pFmax − c
)2
, ΠFX(c) =
1
4γ
(
pHmax − ct
)2
. (4.43)
19As will become apparent in the next subsection, the main mechanism at work in an
open but not in a closed economy setting is a relocation effect. Start-ups prefer to enter
in a low- rather than in a high-wage country. Since centralised and decentralised wage
bargaining both increase expected wage payments, the relocation effect is present under
both bargaining regimes.
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Suppose for the moment that pHmax and pFmax are exogenously given and
identical. Analogous to the findings for the closed economy setting, cen-
tralised bargaining then induces tougher selection; the cost cut-off levels for
firms located in Home are ceteris paribus decreasing in θ. For any given
level of pmax centralised bargaining also depresses firm profits. Inspecting
the maximised profit values in (4.42) and (4.43) furthermore shows that for
θ ≥ t firms are strictly better off by locating in Foreign rather than in Home
(as they can supply both markets at lower costs when based in Foreign). To
ensure a positive mass of domestic entrants in Home, I will therefore assume
that θ is strictly smaller than t. The free entry condition in (4.39) then holds
as an equality.
To solve for the endogenous cost cut-offs levels, use (4.37) and (4.38) to
rewrite profits as ΠHL (c) = θ
2
4γ
(
cHL − c
)2
, ΠHX(c) = θ
2t2
4γ
(
cHX − c
)2
and ΠFL(c) =
1
4γ
(
cFL − c
)2
, ΠFX(c) = t
2
4γ
(
cFX − c
)2
. Given these expressions, the zero profit
conditions can be written as
(cHL )k+2 + t2(cHX)k+2 =
γφ
θ2
, (cFL)k+2 + t2(cFX)k+2 = γφ, (4.44)
where φ ≡ (k + 1)(k + 2)(cM)kfE. Using cHX = cFL/(tθ) and cFX = θcHL /t,
these conditions can be rewritten as a system of two equations in the two
unknowns cHL , cFL :
(cHL )k+2 + τ
(
cFL
θ
)k+2
= γφ
θ2
, (cFL)k+2 + τ(θcHL )k+2 = γφ, (4.45)
with τ ≡ t−k being an inverse measure of trading costs. Solving this system
yields
cHL =
[
2γφ(θk − τ)
(1− τ 2)θk+2
] 1
k+2
, cFL =
[
2γφ(1− τθk)
1− τ 2
] 1
k+2
. (4.46)
The cost cut-offs then pin down the upper price bounds through (4.40) and
(4.41).
Before comparing the resulting equilibrium cut-off levels and the corre-
sponding upper price bounds for Home and Foreign, I analyse first how these
cost thresholds change as trade barriers are dismantled. Calculating the
elasticities of ciL with respect to τ for i = H,F gives
∂cHL
∂τ
τ
cHL
= τ(2τθ
k − τ 2 − 1)
(k + 2)(1− τ 2)(θk − τ) , (4.47)
∂cFL
∂τ
τ
cFL
= τ(2τ − (1 + τ
2)θk)
(k + 2)(1− τ 2)(1− τθk) . (4.48)
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Analysing these elasticities establishes
Proposition 5. Trade liberalization (i.e. an increase in τ) will always lower
the cost cut-off in Foreign. In contrast, trade liberalisation will increase (de-
crease) the cut-off in Home for θk > (1 + τ 2)/2τ . Furthermore, the elasticity
of ciL with respect to τ is strictly larger in Home than its is in Foreign, and
it is increasing in θ in the former country while it is decreasing in θ in the
latter.
Proof. The proof is relegated to Appendix C.3.
With cross-country differences in labour market regimes trade liberali-
sation has to two distinct effects on the cost cut-offs. First, lower trade
barriers increase import competition in both markets. As a result, demand
price elasticities increase, the least productive firms are forced to exit and cHL
and cFL decrease. This is the mechanism highlighted by Melitz and Ottaviano
(2008). If wages were identical across countries, dismantling trade barriers
would always lower the cost cut-offs in both countries. With cross-country
wage differentials, however, trade liberalisation has an additional ‘relocation’
effect. As trade barriers fall, wage differentials become an increasingly im-
portant criterion of location. Consequently, the number of entrants and thus
the intensity of competition increases in the low-wage country and decreases
in the high-wage country. The relocation effect is larger the higher the cross-
country wage differential is. When the wage rate in Home is sufficiently high
relative to the level of trading barriers, the relocation effect dominates and
trade liberalisation strictly increases the cost cut-off in Home. Given (4.40),
it then also follows that the intensity of competition in market H decreases
(pHmax increases).
Proposition 5 thus shows that in an open economy setting the selection
effect of centralised bargaining, described at length for the closed economy
setting, is not only thwarted by the anti-competitive effect of higher wages
but also by a relocation effect. For hight trade costs the selection effect pre-
vails and the cost cut-off is lower in Home than in Foreign. However, the
ordering can be reversed as trade barriers are dismantled. This is demon-
strated in
Proposition 6. The orderings of the cut-off levels, ciL, and the upper price
bounds, pimax, for country i = H,F are as follows:
i. cHL > (<) cFL for τ > (<) (θk+2 − θk)/(θ2k+2 − 1),
ii. pHmax > pFmax.
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Having explicitly calculated the cost cut-off levels and the corresponding
upper price bounds, I can now assess firm-level performance. For doing so,
notice first that in some market i the cost of domestic firms cwi ∈ [0, ciL]
and the delivered cost of exporters tcwj ∈ [0, tcjX ] = [0, ciL] have identical
distributions over the same support, as given by G(c) = (c/ciL)k. Average
firm performance of local firms in i and exporters from j to i are then also
identical, since their output and profit levels depend only on (delivered) costs
and on the common upper price bound pimax. More specifically, I find that
qHL = qFX =
pHmax
2γ(k + 1) , q
F
L = qHX =
pFmax
2γ(k + 1) , (4.49)
ΠHL = Π
F
X =
(pHmax)2
2γ(k + 1)(k + 2) ,
ΠFL = Π
H
X =
(pFmax)2
2γ(k + 1)(k + 2) . (4.50)
Given Proposition 6ii., these average performance measures can be ordered
as follows:
Proposition 7. Output sold in the local market, qiL, and profits earned from
domestic sales, ΠiL, are on average higher for firms located in Home. Thus,
the following orderings are established:
i. qHL = qFX > qFL = qHX ,
ii. ΠHL = Π
F
X > Π
F
L = Π
H
X .
Average profits and sales are thus higher in Home, the country charac-
terised by centralised wage bargaining. This result resembles proposition 2
derived in the closed economy setting. However, in a global world economy
not only domestic firms but also foreign enterprises that export from Foreign
to Home benefit from the relatively low intensity of competition in Home.
Likewise, both local enterprises based in Foreign and exporters from Home
to Foreign suffer from the intense competition in Foreign.
Finally, I assess cross-country differences in product variety and in the
mean of prices. The average price of a variety sold in country i reflects prices
charged by both local firms, piL(c), and by exporting firms from j, p
j
X(c). I
previously described that the cost of domestic firms and the delivered cost of
exporters share the same distribution. This also leads to matching price dis-
tributions. The average price of domestic firms in a country and of exporters
to that country are thus identical and given by pi =
[∫ ciL
0 p
i
LdG(c)
]
/G(ciL).
76
Combining this with equation (4.33) yields:
pH = 2k + 12k + 2p
H
max, p
F = 2k + 12k + 2p
F
max. (4.51)
The number of varieties sold in each market can then be calculated by sub-
stituting (4.51) into (4.28) and rearranging. Doing so gives
NH = 2(k + 1)γ
η
α− pHmax
pHmax
, NF = 2(k + 1)γ
η
α− pFmax
pFmax
. (4.52)
Given propositions 5 and 6, I can conclude:
Proposition 8. The number of varieties in Foreign is strictly higher and
their average price strictly lower than in Home. Trade liberalisation increases
product variety and decreases the average price level in Foreign. In Home,
trade liberalisation increases (decreases) variety and decreases (increases) av-
erage prices for θk < (> ) (1 + τ 2)/2τ .
The flexible-wage country thus features strictly lower prices and higher
product variety than the high-wage country. These orderings thus correspond
to the findings for the closed economy. More interestingly, trade liberalisa-
tion, by weakening competition, can actually decrease product variety and
increase prices in the high-wage country. In contrast, for the low-wage coun-
try conventional wisdom holds and economic integration increases product
variety and lowers prices.
4.6 Conclusion
This paper has studied how the level at which collective wage contracts are
negotiated affects firm productivity and firm performance. While centralised
bargaining induces tougher selection among heterogeneous producers and
thus increases average productivity, firm-level bargaining allows less produc-
tive entrants to stay in the market, as inter-firm productivity differences
will find consideration in firm-level wage settlements. Centralised bargaining
also results in higher average output and in higher profit levels than either
decentralised bargaining or a competitive labour market. Moreover, I have
shown that moving from centralised to decentralised bargaining is not neces-
sarily beneficial for consumers. While firm-level bargaining tends to increase
product variety, it also entails higher product prices.
The paper has also highlighted that the effects of national labour market
regulations may change when goods markets become global. In a two-country
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model of trade between a rigid-wage and a flexible-wage economy, centralised
bargaining still induces tougher selection. Yet unionisation also induces firms
to enter in the low- rather than in the high-wage country. This reduces
competition and average productivity in the latter. As trade barriers fall,
cross-country wage differentials become an increasingly important criterion
for firms in their choice of where to locate. Trade liberalisation can thus
reduce competition and lower productivity in the unionised economy.
The predictions of the theoretical model can be useful in guiding future
empirical work on the relation between unionisation, productivity, and firm
performance. Existing empirical studies mainly seek to identify the effect of
a change in unionisation status on an individual firm in a given industry.20
My work suggests that a more complete analysis requires complementary
evidence on the relation between unionisation structures and average firm
performance at the industry level that also accounts for the endogeneity of
the market structure.
20Evidence on the link between unionisation and productivity is inconclusive, while the
bulk of studies find unionised workplaces to be less profitable than non-unionised ones (cf.
Metcalf, 2003; Hirsch, 2004, for recent surveys of the literature). These findings are not at
odds with the theoretical predictions of the present paper. Holding the market structure
constant, collective bargaining unambiguously decreases firm-level profits.
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Chapter 5
The Impact of Offshoring on
Labour Market Dynamics in
Germany
Abstract. Using an administrative data set containing daily information on
individual workers’ employment histories, we investigate how workers’ labour
market transitions are affected by offshoring. In order to do so, we estimate
hazard rate models for match separations, as well as for worker flows from
employment to another job, to unemployment, and to non-participation. Off-
shoring is found to have no significant impact on overall job stability in the
manufacturing sector, but it is associated with increased job stability in the
service sector. Furthermore, the effect of offshoring varies strongly across skill
levels and age groups. This is especially the case in the manufacturing sector,
where the hazard of transiting to non-employment rises with offshoring for
medium-skilled and older workers.
5.1 Introduction
Fears of economic competition from low-wage countries are widespread
among workers, trade unionists and politicians in many industrialised coun-
tries. The concern is that economies with relatively high labour costs are
adversely affected by labour demand shifting towards economies with lower
labour costs, thereby reducing job stability and increasing unemployment.
One mechanism which is suspected of leading to such an evolution is off-
shoring, which occurs when a domestic firm relocates a (production) process
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to a foreign supplier.1
While a number of theoretical papers has underlined the importance of
offshoring for relative labour demand and factor prices (see, for instance,
Feenstra and Hanson, 1996b; Arndt, 1997; Deardorff, 2001; Kohler, 2004) no
consensus has yet emerged in this regard. Depending on the specific mod-
elling approach, low-skilled workers may lose or benefit from offshoring. More
importantly, there are very few theoretical contributions which depart from
the assumptions of full employment and perfect factor mobility, or which
analyse the short-run dynamics of the globalisation of the production pro-
cess and the ensuing consequences for the labour market. One noteworthy
exception is the article by Mitra and Ranjan (2007), who analyse the impact
of offshoring on unemployment within a two-sector model with search fric-
tions in the labour market. In this model, offshoring can generate an increase
in wages and a decrease in sectoral unemployment rates if labour is mobile
between sectors. This result stands at odds with the public perception where
offshoring is mainly associated with employment losses. However, it is in line
with the argument stressed by the OECD (2007) that offshoring may induce
employment growth by increasing the competitiveness and the productiv-
ity of firms.2 A recent contribution by Egger and Kreickemeier (2008) also
studies offshoring in a model with imperfect labour markets. In their set-
ting, offshoring can induce an expansion of the labour-intensive sector and
accordingly decrease unemployment rates of low-skilled workers.
In this paper, which is a joint work with Ronald Bachmann, we analyse
the effects of offshoring on the dynamics of the German labour market, i.e.
on the stability of job matches, as well as on worker flows. The case of
Germany is particularly interesting for several reasons. First, Germany is
the largest economy in the European Union. Second, it is one of the most
open economies in the world, regularly featuring the highest level of exports
worldwide. Third, offshoring has grown substantially in Germany over recent
years. While offshoring is still more important in manufacturing, during the
1990s growth rates have been considerably higher in the service sector (cf.
Horgos, 2007). Finally, there is evidence that West Germany experienced a
1The term is meant to include both intra-firm and arm’s-length offshoring. In the
former case the foreign supplier is affiliated with the domestic firm, while in the latter it is
independent. The same phenomenon has also been referred to as international production
sharing, fragmentation of production stages, or slicing up the value chain.
2Offshoring will directly boost productivity if internationally traded inputs are of higher
quality than those available domestically. It may also increase productivity by allowing
firms to concentrate on their most efficient activities while relocating relatively inefficient
production stages to foreign production sites (cf. Görg et al., 2008). Empirical evidence
on the link between offshoring and productivity is presented by, for instance, Amiti and
Wei (2006), Egger and Egger (2006), and Görg et al. (2008).
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significant increase in economic turbulence, defined as the pace of structural
change, during the 1990s (cf. Bachmann and Burda, 2008). The acceleration
of offshoring is a natural culprit for this development.
We are not the first to analyse the effects of offshoring on the German
labour market.3 However, while the existing literature is mostly concerned
with job stability only, we additionally investigate the effects of offshoring on
labour market dynamics by looking at worker flows. In particular, we focus on
the three flows resulting from the separation of an employer-employee match:
direct job-to-job transitions, the flow from employment to unemployment,
and the flow from employment to non-participation, i.e. out of the labour
market. The distinction between these three labour market transitions is
important because a match separation can have very different reasons and
consequences. For example, a separation may be initiated by the worker,
who has found a better job. This will in all likelihood result in a direct
job-to-job transition. A separation can also be the consequence of a lay-
off, in which case the worker has a relatively high probability of becoming
unemployed – this entails a transition from employment to unemployment.
The worker may even become discouraged to the extent that she leaves the
labour market altogether. These different transitions have very different
welfare implications, both for the affected worker and for the economy as
a whole. In order to assess the consequences of offshoring, the distinction
between these three flows is therefore crucial.
Our analysis also takes into account the fact that offshoring increasingly
affects sectors outside manufacturing, in particular the service sector. While
until recently services were considered to be largely impervious to interna-
tional competition, rapid developments in information and communication
technology (ICT) have provided increasing opportunities for international
sourcing in the service sector as well. In this context, ICT allows for the
coordination of tasks performed at different locations, facilitates the trans-
mission of instructions and permits the electronic transmission of output. For
instance, ‘knowledge work’, such as data entry and information processing
(IT services), and research and consultancy services (ICT-enabled business
services) can now be carried out remotely via the Internet and tele- and
video-conferencing (cf. OECD, 2004a).
In order to analyse the effects of offshoring in manufacturing and services,
we use a very large micro data set covering 2% of the dependent-status
German employees. Its large size makes it possible to analyse different skill
and age groups in detail. As the data set is derived from administrative
records, it has the further advantage of featuring very little measurement
3See the next section for a discussion of the literature.
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error, as well as being exact to the day. It is thus possible to follow individual
labour market transitions, including direct job-to-job flows, in a very exact
way.
The plan of the paper is as follows: In the next section, we give a brief
review of the relevant literature. The third section of this chapter describes
the data set used, while Section 5.4 presents the econometric method. Section
5.5 contains our estimation results. The last section summarises the results
and concludes.
5.2 Offshoring and the Labour Market in the
Literature
There now exists a sizeable body of empirical studies that investigates the
labour market effects of offshoring. In particular, its impact on relative
labour demand and the wage skill premium has been widely discussed (see,
for instance, Feenstra and Hanson, 1996a, and Feenstra and Hanson, 1999,
for the US; Geishecker and Görg, 2008, for Germany; Hijzen et al., 2005,
for the UK). However, the literature is much thinner when it comes to the
effects on transitional labour market dynamics. At the micro level the issue
at hand has only been addressed by Munch (2005), Pfaffermayr et al. (2007),
and Geishecker (2008).4
Pfaffermayr et al. (2007) examine the importance of offshoring (and trade)
for the year-to-year transition probabilities of employment between sectors.
Using a random sample of Austrian males, the authors estimate a multi-
nomial logit model with fixed effects. They distinguish between six labour
market states: employment in four different sectors, unemployment, and out
of the labour force. The individual data is matched with industry-level trade
and offshoring indicators that are, however, only available for the manufac-
turing sector. The study shows that the probability of staying in or changing
into the manufacturing sector falls as the level of offshoring rises. This find-
ing is more pronounced in manufacturing industries that have a comparative
disadvantage.
Munch (2005) analyses the effects of offshoring on individual job sepa-
rations. The paper concentrates on the Danish manufacturing sector and
combines individual yearly spell data with indicators for offshoring at the
4In addition, Kletzer (2000) studies the effect of offshoring on industry-level displace-
ment rates. However, studies that analyse outcomes at the industry level may suffer both
from an aggregation and an endogeneity bias (see, for instance, Geishecker, 2008, for more
details.)
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industry level. Provided that offshoring is broadly defined, the estima-
tion of a single risk model documents a (small) positive effect of offshoring
on the job separation rate.5 Distinguishing between job-to-job and job-to-
unemployment transition flows, the author also estimates a competing risk
model. Offshoring is found to increase both the unemployment risk and the
job change hazard rate.6 The former effect is stronger for low-skilled, the lat-
ter for high-skilled workers. Munch (2005) concludes that the quantitative
impact of offshoring on out-of-the-job transitions is relatively small.
In a related contribution, Geishecker (2008) analyses the effect of off-
shoring on work-to-non-employment transitions in the German manufactur-
ing sector. Combining monthly individual-level spell data from the Ger-
man Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP) with industry-level offshoring measures,
the study estimates a discrete time hazard model. Geishecker (2008) finds
offshoring, when narrowly defined, to markedly increase the probability of
leaving employment. In contrast to Munch (2005), the effect does not differ
between skill groups but increases with employment duration.
The paper at hand contributes to the existing literature on the effects of
offshoring on labour dynamics in several respects. First, we consider both the
manufacturing and the service sector, and compare the effects offshoring has
in these two sectors.7 Second, we distinguish between the competing risks of
making job-to-job, job-to-unemployment, and job-to-non-employment tran-
sitions. While Munch (2005) has implemented a similar framework in his
analysis of Danish data, no comparable study exists for Germany. Third,
the large size of the data set allows us to perform our analysis for different
age and skill groups. Finally, instead of analysing yearly (Pfaffermayr et al.,
2007; Munch, 2005) or monthly (Geishecker, 2008) transitions, our data set
contains information on the labour market status of workers on a daily basis.
This allows us to consider also very short employment spells and permits a
more thorough treatment of duration dependence.
5However, the offshoring term is rendered statistically insignificant when a narrow
concept of offshoring is employed instead. See Section 5.3.2 for a technical definition of
narrow and broad offshoring.
6Narrow offshoring only has a statistically significant effect on the unemployment haz-
ard of low-skilled workers and the job change hazard of high-skilled workers.
7While an increasing number of papers consider the labour market effects of service
offshoring (see, for instance, Hijzen et al., 2007, for the UK, and Crinò, 2007, for the U.S.),
there exist relatively few studies that examine the impact of offshoring in the service sector.
An exception in this regard is the study by Hijzen and Swaim (2007) that analyses the
employment effects of offshoring in the service (and the manufacturing) sector. Using
industry-level data, they find no negative or even slightly positive effects of offshoring on
sector-level employment.
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5.3 The Data
5.3.1 The IAB Employment Sample
The data set used is the IAB Employment Sample 1975-2004 (IABS), which
is provided by the Institute for Employment Research (IAB) of the German
Federal Employment Agency. The data base covers the employment history
of 2% of all the persons who, between the 1st January 1975 (for western
German employees) or the 1st January 1992 (for eastern German employees)
and the 31st December 2004, worked in an employment covered by social
security, and is representative for this population. The data source consists
of notifications made by employers to the social-security agencies, which in-
clude health insurances, statutory pension schemes, and the unemployment
insurance agencies.8 These notifications are made on the behalf of work-
ers, employees and trainees who pay contributions to the social insurance
system. This means that, for example, civil servants and the self-employed
are not included. Overall, the subsample includes over 1.29 million people,
of which 1.1 million are from western Germany. For 1995, the employment
statistics, from which the IAB Regional File is drawn, cover nearly 79.4%
of the employed persons in western Germany, and 86.2% of all employed
persons in eastern Germany. As for the unemployed, only those entitled to
unemployment benefits are covered.
For the labour market states of employment and unemployment, the fol-
lowing spell information is available: the starting and ending date of the
spell, exact to the day; sex, year of birth, degree of education/training, and
the region of the workplace (in cases of an employment spell) or of the un-
employment office paying benefits (in cases of an unemployment spell). For
employment spells, there is additional information on the occupation and
the gross earnings of the worker, an establishment number, the size of the
establishment, and the economic sector. Furthermore, the information for
employment spells, e.g., with respect to the occupation of an employee, is
updated on an annual basis. We use the information on the degree of educa-
tion/training to define three skill groups: low-skilled workers are individuals
with primary or lower secondary education, medium-skilled workers are in-
dividuals with secondary education and/or a completed apprenticeship, and
high-skilled workers are individuals with tertiary education. The labour mar-
ket state ‘non-participation’ is not directly recorded in the data set but can
be inferred. A worker is in this state if she does not work full time and
does not receive unemployment benefits. This means that non-participation
8For a complete description of the data set, see Bender et al. (2000) and Drews (2007).
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can coincide with the state ‘out of the labour force’. However, it can also
mean self-employment, civil-service employment9, retirement, or marginal
employment.10
The advantages of the data set are thus as follows: First, it does not suffer
from the problems inherent in most panel data sets, e.g., there is no sample
attrition, and it follows workers over a long period of time because there is
no need for rotation as in the Current Population Survey (CPS). Second, it
offers observations at a very high frequency, which means that every actual
transition is observed. Again, this is a distinct advantage over survey data
like the CPS or the SOEP, which do not record multiple transitions that
take place between two interview dates and, in the case of the SOEP, uses
retrospective data and does not record all direct job-to-job transitions.
Worker transitions can be inferred from the employment and unemploy-
ment histories in the data set. We consider transitions between two labour
market states (employment to unemployment or employment to non-partici-
pation), as well as transitions from one job to the other (direct job-to-job
transitions).11 It has to be taken into account that there might be mea-
surement error in the data because of the way the data are collected. In
particular, workers’ notifications of becoming unemployed might not always
correspond exactly to the actual change of labour market state. For exam-
ple, this can arise when a worker gets laid off and does not report to the
unemployment office immediately. We correct for this latter potential mea-
surement error in the following way: If the time interval between two records
(employment or unemployment) is smaller than 45 days, then this is counted
as a direct transition between the two states recorded.12 If the gap between
two notifications is larger than 45 days, then this is counted as an intervening
spell of non-participation.
As the labour market records on workers from West Germany start in
1975, i.e. 16 years before the first year of our analysis, their employment
durations are accurately observed. For West Germans, the data therefore
do not suffer from a problem of left-censoring. East German workers are
only included in the data set from 1992 onwards, and there is no information
on their labour market history before that date. We regard this as a minor
problem, as the labour market history of East Germans before reunification
9This applies to ‘Beamte’, public sector employees under a special, life-time form of
civil service employment. Other workers in the public sector are included in the data set.
10 Bachmann and Schaffner (2008) show that the IAB Employment Sample nevertheless
represents aggregate labour market dynamics in Germany well.
11The notion of a job in the data set is establishment (not firm) based.
12We did the calculation for smaller intervals as well. This does not change the results
significantly.
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is in all likelihood not very informative for our analysis. First, officially there
was hardly any unemployment in East Germany before 1990. Second, the
human capital accumulated by East German workers was difficult to transfer
to the new economic environment after reunification.
For our analysis, which is described in Section 5.4, we consider workers
who were employed full-time in the manufacturing or service sector at least
once during the time period 1991-2000. We furthermore exclude workers
from the analysis who are younger than 18 years or older than 65 years.
These sample restrictions leave us with observations on 175,572 workers in
the service sector and 84,051 workers in the manufacturing sector.13
5.3.2 Industry-level Data
For the purpose of our study, the most important indicator at the industry
level is our measure of offshoring. The latter is considered to be a make-
or-buy decision. A firm can either produce a given (intermediate) input in-
house or buy it from a (foreign) supplier. Offshoring is then reflected in the
foreign content of domestic production and can be measured by the share of
imported intermediate inputs in total production. Following the terminology
introduced by Feenstra and Hanson (1999), we distinguish between offshoring
in a narrow and in a wide sense.
Narrow offshoring is defined as the shift of an industry’s core activity
abroad. Attention is hence restricted to inputs that are imported from the
same (two-digit) industry abroad. For instance, intermediate products that
the textile sector in Germany imports from some foreign textile sector will
count as offshoring. On the contrary, intermediates imported from a foreign
food sector by the German textile sector will not be taken into account.
Consequently, the offshoring intensity of an industry is measured by the value
of intermediate inputs imported from the same industry abroad relative to
the total production value of that industry. Largely following the concept
proposed by Feenstra and Hanson (1999), and Feenstra and Hanson (1996a),
the narrow offshoring indicator is calculated as
OFFSHnit =
IMPit
Yit
, (5.1)
where IMPit indicates the value of imported intermediate inputs from in-
dustry i abroad and Yit gives the production value of industry i in period
t.
13For computational reasons, we only use 50% of the workers covered by the IABS in
the empirical analysis.
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Defining offshoring in a narrow sense accounts only for inputs imported
from the same industry abroad. Such an approach has its merits since classi-
fying imports from other industries as offshoring can often be misleading. To
borrow an example cited by Feenstra and Hanson (1999), the import of steel
by a domestic car manufacturer is typically not classified as offshoring since
that company would never have produced steel in the first place. Hence, a
measure of offshoring should exclude such imports, which is precisely what
the narrow indicator does.
However, by restricting attention to an industry’s core activity, the narrow
concept of offshoring might miss important offshoring activities, in particular
when it comes to service activities. For instance, a car manufacturer might
well close its own in-house accounting department and instead purchase the
corresponding service from a foreign-based company. Such relocation of ac-
tivities will not be captured by the narrow measure of offshoring. We there-
fore also employ a broader concept of offshoring that accounts for the total
sum of (non-energy) inputs that an industry i imports from all j industries
abroad.14 Formally, the wide offshoring indicator is calculated as
OFFSHwit =
∑
j IMPjt
Yit
. (5.2)
Notice that an increase in both the narrow and the wide indicator does not
necessarily reflect the transfer of existing production processes abroad but
may also mirror that newly established processes are subcontracted to foreign
firms. Hence, an increase in the offshoring intensity does not necessarily
imply a displacement of domestic jobs.
Data on imported intermediates and production values are obtained from
Input-Output tables of the German Federal Statistical Office (Statistisches
Bundesamt, 2002). Information is provided at the NACE two-digit sector
level (WZ93), and on an annual basis. Comparable figures are currently only
available for the period 1991 to 2000 (and then again for the years 2000
to 2005). The upper panel of Figure 5.1 shows that narrow offshoring has
increased significantly in both sectors. However, growth rates were consid-
erably higher in services, where narrow offshoring has increased by at about
180 percent from 1991 to 2000; for manufacturing the increase was 45.9
percent even though from a much higher base.15 While the service sector
has therefore been catching up, narrow offshoring still remains considerably
14Notice that attention is not restricted to inputs from foreign service or manufacturing
sectors. In fact, our wide indicator accounts for all inputs imported from abroad (excluding
energy inputs).
15Notice that we do not distinguish between material and service offshoring, but between
offshoring in the manufacturing sector and offshoring in the service sector.
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more important in manufacturing. The lower panel of Figure 5.1 illustrates
that growth rates of offshoring are much less pronounced when the latter is
measured using a wide rather than a narrow concept. Nevertheless, in both
sectors wide offshoring was clearly showing an upwards trend in the second
half of the 1990s. The development was somewhat more dynamic in services,
but even in manufacturing wide offshoring increased by almost 30 percent
between 1991 and 2000. The wide measure also confirms the previous finding
that offshoring is still more prevalent in manufacturing.
Differences exist not only between narrow and wide offshoring and be-
tween manufacturing and service sectors in general, but also at a more dis-
aggregated level. Table 5.1 documents the development of narrow and wide
offshoring at the two-digit sector level. Most industries have experienced
tremendous increases in the intensity of narrow offshoring. In some sec-
tors, such as ‘wearing apparel’ or ‘post and telecommunication’, growth rates
reached 100 percent or more over the ten-year period considered. Other in-
dustries, however, such as ‘printing and publishing’, show no or little upward
trend in their offshoring intensity during the 1990s. In addition, some ser-
vices still remain non-tradable. Accordingly, narrow offshoring does not play
any role in, for instance, the hotel and restaurant sector. Wide offshoring,
in contrast, is widespread among hotels and restaurants: a mean value of
6.7 puts the industry at the upper range of service sectors. This example
also illustrates that the disparities between the two indicators are not lim-
ited to a pure level difference. For services in particular, wide and narrow
offshoring can provide different angles on the offshoring phenomenon. This is
also reflected in the fact that narrow and wide offshoring are far from being
perfectly correlated. The correlation coefficient is 0.72 for manufacturing and
0.32 for the service sector.16
16Correlations were calculated using our final dataset at the micro level.
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Figure 5.1: The Degree of Narrow and Wide Offshoring in Manufacturing
and Services in Germany, 1991 - 2000
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Unfortunately, the industry classification WZ93 is used in the IABS data
only from 1999 onwards. For the previous period, workers are assigned to
industries according to the older WZ73 classification. Since no recoding
scheme exists at present, the reassignment of workers from WZ73 to WZ93
sectors was done manually. We used the finer three-digit WZ73 classification
provided in the IABS dataset and assigned each WZ73 sector to one of the
sectors distinguished between in the WZ93 classification.17 The recoding was
then tested for the years 1999 and 2000, for which both classification schemes
exist in the data. Observations that could not be classified with a certain
degree of precision had to be deleted from the dataset.18 In the two years
tested, the misclassification error amounted to approximately 5 percent.
Further industry-level measures used in the empirical analysis are the
production value and the capital-output ratio. The former is again taken
from the German Federal Statistical Office (Statistisches Bundesamt, 2002)
while the latter is computed from data of the OECD STAN and the EU-
KLEMS database (cf. Koszerek et al., 2007). Finally, we include regional
unemployment rates as provided by the German Federal Employment Office
(Bundesagentur für Arbeit, 2007).
The summary statistics of the sample used in the estimations are dis-
played in Table D.1.
5.4 Econometric Framework and Estimation
Strategy
In order to analyse the effect of offshoring on the hazards of job separation
and of experiencing different labour market transitions, we estimate hazard
rate models. As our dataset contains daily information on individual work-
ers’ employment histories, we use a specification in continuous time. Since
econometric theory offers little guidance on choosing a functional form for
the hazard function, we opt for a semi-parametric approach and estimate a
piecewise-constant exponential (PCE) model. In contrast to parametric ap-
proaches the PCE model allows for more flexibility in the shape of the hazard
function and, unlike the Cox proportional hazards model, it provides explicit
estimates of the baseline hazard function. The PCE model is an example
of a proportional hazard model. Therefore, the conditional hazard rate of
17As shown in Table 5.1 some service sectors had to be pooled to avoid ambiguous
assignments. A detailed overview of the reassignment can be obtained from the authors
upon request.
18We deleted any WZ73 observation that could not be assigned to a WZ93 sector with
a precision of at least 75 percent.
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leaving employment λ(t|X) satisfies the separability condition:
λ(t|X(t)) = λ0(t)exp(β′X(t)) (5.3)
where X is a vector of individual, potentially time-varying, characteristics,
and λ0 denotes the baseline hazard.19 The PCE model assumes that the
baseline hazard is constant within a specified time interval but does not
impose further functional form assumptions. The baseline hazard is then a
step function with k segments
λ0(t) = λj, aj−1 ≤ t < aj, j = 1, ..., k. (5.4)
We specify five such segments: 0 to 182 days of employment duration, 183
to 365 days, 366 to 1095 days, 1096 to 2920 days, and more than 2920 days.
Even though we control for a wide array of observable characteristics, the
hazard rates of observationally equivalent individuals may still differ from
each other. Ignoring such unobserved heterogeneity in duration models pro-
duces incorrect results (cf. Lancaster, 1990). To account for unobserved
heterogeneity, the proportional hazard model is extended to allow for a multi-
plicative unobserved heterogeneity term υ, which yields a mixed proportional
hazard model.20 The hazard function then becomes
λ(t|X(t), υ) = λ0(t)exp(β′X(t))υ, (5.5)
where υ follows a Gamma distribution, a choice rationalised by Abbring and
Van den Berg (2007), and is assumed to be independent of regressors and
censoring time. The heterogeneity term is shared across different spells of a
given individual, causing observations within groups to be correlated.
The hazard of job separation involves one single risk. In a first step, we
can therefore simply estimate the above model for this hazard. In a second
step, we distinguish between the different destination states of a worker leav-
ing a job. We thus estimate the competing hazards of transiting from one
job to another, from employment to unemployment, and from employment
19In proportional hazard models with time-varying covariates, standard tools of dura-
tion analysis can only be applied under certain condition (cf. Van den Berg, 2001). In
particular, explanatory variables have to be predictable processes, a concept which ba-
sically requires weak exogeneity (cf. Ridder and Tunali, 1999). The condition is clearly
fulfilled in the present context. Notice in particular that our main variable of interest is
measured at the industry level and beyond the control of an individual employee. Fur-
thermore, episode splitting is required in order to estimate continuous-time PCE models
with time-covarying covariates. The survival time (episode) for each individual has to be
split into subperiods within which each time-varying covariate is constant.
20See Van den Berg (2001) for a survey of this model class.
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to non-participation. For continuous time models and in the absence of a
correlation between the destination-specific unobserved heterogeneity terms,
the log-likelihood for a model with three destinations can be partitioned into
the sum of three sub-contributions, each of which depends only on parame-
ters of a single destination-specific hazard. The overall likelihood can then
be maximised by maximising the three component parts separately (cf., for
instance, Kalbfleisch and Prentice, 2002). Accordingly, the competing risk
model is estimated as a number of single-risk duration models, one for each
of the three destinations. Spells ending in any destination other than the one
considered are treated as right censored. Thus, the above model is estimated
separately for each of the three competing risks.
As described in Section 5.3.2, we use an offshoring indicator measured
at the industry level as an explanatory variable. Because this indicator is
common to several individuals, the standard errors are potentially subject
to a downward bias (cf. Moulton, 1990). This is due to the fact that such
aggregate explanatory variables do not provide independent information for
each individual. Following Geishecker (2008), we argue that the data do
not allow us to correct for this problem directly, i.e. through clustering,
because the number of clusters is small relative to the number of observations.
Instead, we include industry and region fixed effects, as well as linear time
trends for every industry. This corrects for residual correlation within clusters
due to time-invariant, and, in the case of the industry trends, time-variant
unobserved heterogeneity.
We also want to make sure that the offshoring indicator does not capture
effects which are industry-specific, but unrelated to offshoring. Therefore, in
addition to fixed effects and industry-specific time trends that capture tech-
nological changes at the industry level (cf. Geishecker and Görg, 2008), we
also include the production value and the capital intensity for every indus-
try.21 Furthermore, monthly dummies are used to take seasonal effects into
account. Finally, yearly dummies and regional unemployment rates capture
differences in economic conditions over time and across regions.
The hazard rate models described above are estimated separately for the
manufacturing and the service sector. For each sector, we first estimate a
basic specification with the narrow offshoring indicator as one of the ex-
planatory variables. A second specification includes the interaction of the
offshoring indicator with workers’ skill levels, and a third specification fea-
21Research and development expenditure is sometimes used as an alternative proxy for
technological change. The measure has the advantage of allowing for non-linear technolog-
ical progress at the industry level. Unfortunately, for many service sectors, data are not
available over the time period considered. Moreover, even for the manufacturing sector,
research and development data are only collected biannually.
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tures the interaction of the offshoring indicator with different age classes.
The two latter specifications are meant to capture skill- or age-specific ef-
fects of offshoring. We then re-estimate the hazard rate models using the
wide rather than the narrow offshoring indicator.
5.5 Estimation Results
5.5.1 The baseline specification
For the first specification, and using a narrow concept of offshoring, the re-
sults for the hazard of match separation, as well as for the hazards of the
three transitions (EE, EU, EN) are in Tables 5.2 and 5.4 for the manufactur-
ing and the service sector, respectively. Generally, the results are in line with
the literature on labour market flows (cf. Mortensen and Pissarides, 1999).
First, there is negative duration dependence, i.e. the hazard of separating
or of making a specific labour market transition falls with match duration.
This is generally attributed to the accumulation of human capital and sort-
ing effects (cf. Machin and Manning, 1999). Second, men are considerably
less likely to separate from their employer. As an inspection of the individ-
ual flows reveals, this is despite the fact that they experience more direct
job-to-job transitions than women. This is outweighed by the fact that they
are much less likely to become unemployed or non-employed, which is prob-
ably to a large extent due to women playing a more important role for child
care at home than men. Third, the match separation - age profile displays
a U-shape. The jobs of young and old employees are much less stable than
jobs of middle-aged employees. Young employees have a high probability of
experiencing a direct job-to-job transition, as they engage in job-shopping
at the beginning of their working lives (cf. Neal, 1999). Older workers, on
the other hand, have a higher probability of leaving the labour market due
to retirement, which implies an EN flow. Fourth, foreigners have a higher
probability of separating than German nationals, which is entirely due to
the fact that they leave the labour market more often. Fifth, employees with
low skills and employees with high skills have less stable jobs than employees
with medium skills. For the former, this is mainly due to higher inflows into
unemployment and flows out of the social security work force. For the latter,
lower inflows into unemployment are outweighed by higher job-to-job transi-
tions and higher flows out of the social-security work force. Finally, firm size
is generally negatively correlated with the hazard of separating.
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5.5.2 Offshoring in the manufacturing sector
The coefficients on the narrow offshoring indicator yield the result we are
most interested in, the impact of offshoring on the different hazard rates.
For the manufacturing sector, the results for the hazard of job separation
indicate that narrow offshoring has no statistically significant effect on overall
job stability. Indeed, no statistically significant effect can be established for
any of the three skill categories, as illustrated by the results for Specification
II in the first column of Table 5.3. However, as the first column of this
table for Specification III makes clear, offshoring in the manufacturing sector
is correlated with significantly increased separation rates for older workers.
This means that, although overall job stability is not reduced by offshoring,
this seems to be the case for older workers.
Table 5.2 also shows that the single risk model masks important effects
of narrow offshoring on the destination-specific hazards. In particular, the
estimation results for the different transition hazards show that offshoring
of core activities increases the hazard of transitions from a job in the man-
ufacturing sector to non-participation. Not distinguishing between different
skill groups, the estimates imply that a one percentage point increase in the
offshoring intensity increases the hazard of leaving the social security work
force by about exp(0.026) − 1 = 2.6 percent. Including interaction terms
between skill and offshoring (cf. Specification II in Table 5.3) shows that
the effect is most pronounced for medium-skilled workers, but also applies
to workers with low and high skills (however, for these two groups the ef-
fect is only significant at the 10% level). In contrast, no effect is found for
job-to-job and job-to-unemployment transitions for either skill group. Our
results suggest an explanation for the finding of a negative effect of narrow
offshoring on individual employment security by Geishecker (2008), the only
comparable study for Germany. In particular, his finding seems to be driven
by the transitions from a job to non-participation. Our finding that medium-
skilled workers are most, and adversely, affected by offshoring is consistent
with a “hollowing-out” of the labour market, which has been found by, e.g.,
Autor et al. (2003) for the U.S., and Spitz-Oener (2006) for Germany. This
concept describes the reallocation of workers from middle-skill occupations
towards the tails of the occupational skill distribution.
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Finally for the manufacturing sector, the effect of narrow offshoring on
the destination-specific hazards differs between age groups. As Specification
III in Table 5.3 shows, offshoring is significantly and negatively correlated
with the hazard of making a transition from employment to unemployment
for middle-aged workers, while the same correlation is positive for older work-
ers. This means that the unemployment risk rises with offshoring for older
workers, while it falls with offshoring for middle-aged workers. One potential
explanation for this result is that the effects of offshoring are multi-faceted:
while the productivity of firms is increased, the skill requirements of the
production processes that are still performed in-house also change. Younger
workers are able to adapt to the latter, and thus to benefit from productiv-
ity gains, which overall reduces their risk of becoming unemployed. Older
workers are generally less likely to fulfill the new skill requirements, which
makes them more vulnerable to unemployment. This is also consistent with
the result that the risk of exiting the labour market rises with offshoring for
older workers only.
5.5.3 Offshoring in the service sector
For the service sector, the basic regression result for the hazard of match
separation is very different from the result obtained for the manufacturing
sector (cf. Table 5.4). In particular, narrow offshoring is significantly, and
positively correlated with job stability in the service sector. An inspection of
the results for the different flows shows that this is due to the fact that off-
shoring is strongly, and negatively, correlated with the hazard of experiencing
a direct job-to-job transition.22 A possible explanation for this, at first sight
surprising, finding is that (narrow) offshoring, by increasing the division of
labour and thus the specialization of production, is likely to lead to higher
levels of competitiveness and productivity of firms. This may translate into
higher wages and better job prospects (cf. OECD, 2007). If job-to-job tran-
sitions are to a certain degree voluntary, offshoring, by allowing firms to offer
more attractive jobs, increases job stability as it induces workers to stay with
their employers.23 Empirical evidence on the wage effects of offshoring could
strengthen or undermine the argument. Unfortunately, at present no such
22The magnitude of the coefficients is high, suggesting that an increase in the offshoring
intensity by one percentage point will decrease the hazard of a job-to-job transition by
23.4 percent. However, it has to be taken into account that such an increase would be
massive in the service sector, since the average offshoring intensity amounted to just 1.3
percent in the year 2000.
23It should be stressed that by no means all job-to-job transitions reflect voluntary job
changes. The protection against (instantaneous) dismissal in Germany allows workers to
make direct job-to-job transitions even though they were laid off against their will in the
Chapter 5. The Impact of Offshoring on Labour Market Dynamics 101
evidence exists for the German service sector.24 However, this explanation
is not at odds with previous empirical evidence. In a cross-country study
for 17 OECD countries Hijzen and Swaim (2007) find no negative or even
slightly positive effects of offshoring on labour demand in the service (and
the manufacturing) sector.
Alternatively, and in sharp contrast to the previous explanation, the re-
sult may hint at declining employment prospects of industries that increase
their offshoring intensity. This should arguably also lower workers’ inclina-
tion to leave their job voluntarily, which lowers direct job-to-job transitions.
While the argument cannot be conclusively dismissed, the results for the
other two hazards do not support this view. In particular, for the service
sector, we do not find any evidence for narrow offshoring to decrease em-
ployment security, i.e. to increase the hazard of job-to-unemployment and
job-to-non-employment transitions. On the contrary, including interaction
terms between offshoring and skill levels shows that employment security of
high-skilled workers even increases with the narrow offshoring intensity of
an industry: the hazards of making a transition to unemployment and to
non-participation both fall for high-skilled workers (cf. Specification II in
Table 5.5). This may again point to a rise in firms’ labour demand due to
offshoring boosting productivity and competitiveness. Neither of these two
hazards are affected by offshoring for low-skilled and medium-skilled work-
ers. Therefore, for these worker groups, the increase in job security that goes
along with offshoring is entirely due to a decrease of the hazard of making a
direct job-to-job transition.
first place.
24A recent paper by Geishecker and Görg (2008) finds a positive (negative) wage effect
for high-skilled (low-skilled) workers but concentrates on manufacturing only.
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Finally, the effect of narrow offshoring in the service sector differs much
less between age groups than in the manufacturing sector. Specification II
in Table 5.5 shows that for all age groups, offshoring is negatively correlated
with the hazards of separating and of transiting directly from one job to
another. The only transition hazard where offshoring seems to have an age-
specific effect is the transition from employment to non-participation. While
this hazard rises with narrow offshoring for very young workers (aged 18-
24) and relatively old workers (55-59), it falls with offshoring for middle-
aged workers. The latter effect can again be attributed to the productivity-
enhancing effect of offshoring. The effect on older workers in the service
sector is similar to the one in manufacturing and therefore probably also
due to the fact that older workers have difficulties adapting to changed skill
requirements. The effect on younger workers could be due to the fact that
these workers try to keep up with changing skill requirements by returning
to full-time education. Unfortunately, our data set does not allow us to
investigate these hypotheses further.
A potential explanation for why the effects of offshoring on labour mar-
ket dynamics differ so markedly between sectors may be found in differences
in the economic situation of the two sectors. In manufacturing, firms may
have predominately relocated existing production processes to foreign pro-
duction sites in an attempt to remain internationally competitive. Clearly
then, existing jobs will be displaced by offshoring even though the negative ef-
fect is partly compensated by the positive pro-competitive and productivity-
enhancing effect. In contrast, over the time period considered, the service
sector was constantly expanding. Hence, the rise in offshoring in the service
sector may be driven by domestic firms subcontracting newly created pro-
duction processes to foreign firms. Therefore, domestic workers may reap the
benefits of offshoring while their jobs are not directly put at risk.
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5.5.4 Narrow vs. wide offshoring
We performed the same analysis for the manufacturing and the service sector
using the wide offshoring indicator. As Table 5.6 shows, the results for the
manufacturing sector are very similar when using the wide rather than the
narrow offshoring concepts. The coefficient on the wide indicator is not
significant for separations and for direct job-to-job transitions, and it is only
significant (and negative) at the 10% level for the transition from employment
to unemployment. In contrast to that, the hazard of exiting the labour
market is significantly increased both in the case of the narrow indicator (at
the 1% level) and the wide indicator (at the 5% level). Interestingly, the
fact that this effect is strongest for medium-skilled workers holds for both
indicators.25 Given the strong correlation between the two indicators in the
manufacturing sector, the similarity of the results might not seem surprising.
However, previous studies did not find significant effects of wide offshoring
(cf. Geishecker, 2008).
In the service sector, on the other hand, the overlap of the two indica-
tors is much less pronounced than in the manufacturing sector. This is also
reflected in the results. In general, when using the wide indicator we con-
tinue to find a positive correlation between offshoring and job stability in
the service sector. However, the effect is quantitatively much smaller than
for narrow offshoring. Moreover, inspecting the results for the different flows
unearths some important differences. In particular, when measured using a
wide concept, offshoring is no longer statistically significantly correlated with
the overall hazard of direct job-to-job flows in the service sector. In contrast,
wide offshoring in the service sector is negatively associated with the hazard
of making a transition from employment to unemployment as well as from
employment to non-participation.
While for services the results for wide and narrow offshoring are therefore
clearly very different, they could be due to the same underlying mechanism.
As argued above, an increase in offshoring is likely to increase productivity.
This implies that firms are able to offer higher wages to their employees,
which potentially reduces voluntary job-to-job transitions. This seems to
be the case for narrow offshoring. On the other hand, the increase in pro-
ductivity can also decrease involuntary transitions to unemployment and
non-participation, as observed for wide offshoring. The contrasting findings
could be due to wide offshoring being less correlated with any direct (nega-
tive) employment effect of offshoring.26 The productivity-increasing effect of
25The results for age and skill groups are not reported for the wide offshoring indicator
but are available from the authors upon request.
26For instance, employment in a software firm will not be directly affected when the
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offshoring then induces employment growth and increases job security. As a
consequence, workers are more willing to change their jobs and increase mo-
bility which in turn counterbalances any negative effect of higher wages on
job-to-job flows. Furthermore, composition effects are likely to play a role for
the differing results. As pointed out in Section 5.3, due to the non-tradeable
nature of some service products, narrow offshoring is zero throughout the
sample period in some service sectors. Wide offshoring, in contrast, is always
positive and varies over time. Hence, when using the wide rather than the
narrow concept of offshoring, identification does not hinge on a subset of
sectors only. This can give rise to composition effects and hence explain the
observed differences with workers in different sectors reacting differently to
changes in offshoring.
5.6 Conclusion
In this paper, we have investigated the impact of offshoring on job stability
as well as on worker flows from employment to another job, to unemploy-
ment, and out of the labour force. Our analysis has focused on the German
manufacturing and service sectors during the time period 1991-2000. Using
a very large administrative micro data set covering 2% of German employ-
ees, we have estimated hazard rate models for the hazards of separating,
and of experiencing the three transitions mentioned above. Industry-level
measures of offshoring were derived from input-output tables and included
as explanatory variables in the regressions.
Our results can be summarised as follows: First, neither narrow nor wide
offshoring has an impact on overall job stability in the manufacturing sector.
However, the flow from employment in manufacturing to non-participation
displays a negative correlation with offshoring. The only comparable study
for Germany (Geishecker, 2008) has found a negative effect of narrow off-
shoring on individual employment security but did not distinguish between
worker flows. Therefore, in light of our results, Geishecker’s result seems to
be driven by the transitions from a job to non-participation. Second, provid-
ing the first evidence for offshoring in the service sector, we have found both
offshoring measures to be associated with an increase in overall job stability.
Narrow offshoring reduces the hazard of job-to-job transitions for all workers
while wide offshoring is negatively associated with the hazard of making a
transition from service employment to unemployment as well as from service
latter starts purchasing accounting services from a foreign rather than from a domestic
firm. Purchasing programming capacities from abroad is, in contrast, more likely to be
associated with a direct job loss in the firm.
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employment to non-participation. Third, while the effects of offshoring are
neutral or even beneficial overall, they are strongly heterogeneous. Looking
at differences between skill groups, in the manufacturing sector the hazard
of leaving the labour market is most strongly increased for medium-skilled
workers. In the service sector, on the other hand, high-skilled workers seem
to benefit most from narrow offshoring as their hazard of transiting from em-
ployment to any of the three labour market states falls. Finally, in contrast
to previous studies we have also analysed age groups in detail. The estimates
suggest that the effects of offshoring are strongly age-specific in the manufac-
turing sector. Here, while overall job stability remains unaffected, for older
workers it is significantly reduced by offshoring. This is due to the fact that
their hazard of becoming unemployed and of leaving the labour market is
significantly raised.
Our paper thus contributes to the growing evidence that offshoring has
no negative effects on aggregate labour market performance. However, we
have shown that certain worker groups seem to be adversely affected. Fur-
thermore, we have demonstrated that there exist important differences in the
effects of offshoring between the manufacturing and the service sector, and
that it is crucial to distinguish between different labour market transitions.
The underlying reasons for these differences, however, remain a matter of
further investigation. In general, there are two competing forces at work:
On the one hand, offshoring can directly reduce labour demand by domestic
firms, which reduces job stability, at least in the short run; on the other hand,
firms that engage in offshoring may increase their competitiveness and their
profitability. This has the potential of increasing employment, and leading
to greater job stability and lower labour market turnover. While we have
provided some first explanations for why these effects may differ between
sectors, worker groups, and labour market transitions, gaining a more thor-
ough understanding of the reasons underlying our empirical findings is clearly
warranted.
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Appendix A
Economic Integration, Process
and Product Innovation, and
Relative Skill Demand
A.1 Proof of Proposition 1
Proof. What remains to be shown for the proposition to hold is that increas-
ing the investment in product R&D will induce output changes, which further
increase the incentives for product innovation. In the symmetric equilibrium,
marginal benefits of investing in product innovation are increasing in q1F q1H .
Taking the first derivative with respect to e gives
∂(q1F q1H)
∂e
= q1F
∂q1H
∂e
+ q1H
∂q1F
∂e
, (A.1)
which has to be negative for the proposition to hold (remember that e
is an inverse measure of product differentiation). Substituting equations
(2.12) and (2.13) into (A.1) and rearranging gives the following condition for
∂(q1F q1H)
∂e
< 0:
(q1F + q1H)(a− α(k)w)
(2 + e)2 +
4q1Het
(4− e2)2 ≥
q1F (4 + e2)t
(4− e2)2 . (A.2)
Since q1H ≥ q1F for t ≥ 0, the condition above will still hold if one replaces
q1H by q1F on the left hand side. Simple calculation then reveals that the
condition reduces to
2(a− α(k)w) ≥ t, (A.3)
which has to hold for positive levels of intra-industry trade.
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A.2 Proof of Proposition 3
Proof. Differentiating equation (2.18) with respect to t (and ignoring the
common denominator) shows that the first effect identified in proposition 2
will outweigh the third if the following condition holds:
w2
r2
(q1H + q1F )
(
∂q1H
∂t
+ ∂q1F
∂t
)
(q1H + q1F )(c− k1)+
4
r2
(
q1Hq
2
1F
∂q1H
∂t
+ q21Hq1F
∂q1F
∂t
)
(q1H + q1F )(c− k1)−(
w2(q1H + q1F )2
2r2 +
2q21Hq21F
r2
)(
∂q1H
∂t
+ ∂q1F
∂t
)
(c− k1) ≤ 0. (A.4)
Multiply out and rearrange to obtain
(φ+ 4q1Hq31F )
∂q1H
∂t
+ (φ+ 4q31Hq1F )
∂q1F
∂t
≤ 0, (A.5)
with φ = 1/2w2q21H + w2q1Hq1F + 1/2w2q21F + 2q21Hq21F > 0. For positive
levels of exports the condition has to be fulfilled since −∂q1F
∂t
> ∂q1H
∂t
and
q1H ≥ q1F > 0. This proves the second part of proposition 3. The first
part follows directly from the fact that the remaining second effect will also
depress the demand for unskilled workers, i.e. work into the same direction
as the first one does.
Appendix B
Foreign Competition,
Multinational Firms, and the
Effects of One-Sided Wage
Rigidity
B.1 Proof of Proposition 1
Proof. I start with differentiating equations (3.26), (3.30) and (3.31) with
respect to we to find
∂εc
∂we
= reRe(Le − Ue)(we(Le − Ue) + reRe)2 > 0,
∂εoe
∂we
= cwa(c+ t)
( −n(n− 1)
(nwa(c+ t)− c(n− 1)we)2 −
2
(wa(c+ t) + cwe)2
)
+ rRe(Le − Ue)(we(Le − Ue) + reRe)2 <
∂εc
∂we
,
∂εoa
∂wa
= cwa(c+ t)
( −(n− 1)n
(cnwa − (n− 1)(c+ t)we)2 −
2
(cwa + (c+ t)we)2
)
< 0.
Next, one can calculate the wage rate at which εoe exactly equals εc. This
is true for we = nwa(c+t)c(3n−2) . Moreover, ε
oe coincides with the lower bound of εc
(i.e. with minus one) for we = cnwa(c+t)(3n−2) . Combining these findings with the
results concerning the derivatives of the elasticities with respect to we, the
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open economy elasticities are always lower than εc for
we ≥ nwa(c+ t)
c(3n− 2) , (B.1)
we ≥ cnwa(c+ t)(3n− 2) . (B.2)
Consider first condition (B.1) referring to the wage elasticity of production
for market e. From equation (3.28) one can infer that for nonnegative levels
of exports into the European market, we has to be equal to or larger than
(n−1)wa(c+t)
cn
. Plugging this lower bound into equation (B.1) leaves us with
n−1
n
≥ n3n−2 , which is always fulfilled for the assumption n ≥ 2. Similarly,
for the American market one can derive a lower bound for we from equation
(3.27) assuming Xnaa > 0.1 Substituting into condition (B.2) yields again
n−1
n
≥ n3n−2 .
B.2 Proof of Proposition 2
Proof. Taking the first derivative of exports from America to Europe with
respect to we yields
∂Xnae
∂we
=β(2n− 1)(nwa(c+ t)(Le − Ue)(c(3n− 1)we − (n− 1)wa(c+ t)))(n(c+ t)wa + cnwe)3
+ β(2n− 1)(cnRe((3n− 2)wa(c+ t)− cnwe)re)(n(c+ t)wa + cnwe)3 . (B.3)
This expression is nonnegative if we ≥ (n−1)(c+t)wa(3n−1)c and we ≤ (3n−2)wa(c+t)cn .
By plugging in the lower and upper bound for we as derived from equation
(3.27) and (3.28), one obtains 1
n
≥ 13n−1 and nn−1 ≤ 3n−2n . The assumption
n ≥ 2 guarantees that these conditions are satisfied.
The derivative of production of a firm based in America for its domestic
market with respect to European wages is given by
∂Xnaa
∂we
= β(waLa + raRa)(2n− 1)(c+ t)(cwa(3n− 2)− nwe(c+ t))
n2((c+ t)we + cwa)3
. (B.4)
The expression will be nonnegative for we ≤ cwa(3n−2)n(c+t) which can again be
verified by plugging in the upper bound of we.
1The assumption follows directly from assuming nonnegative intra-industry trade. A
national firm will always produce for the domestic market provided that it is an exporter.
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Figure B.1: Effect of a European Minimum Wage on Unemployment for
Different Trading Costs
B.3 The Role of Trading Barriers
In the main text I have illustrated in section 3.4 how the effects of a one-sided
minimum wage in an open economy with multinationals differ from those in
a closed economy and an open economy without multinational firms. It has
been shown that the effects of national labour market institutions are much
more pronounced in a world in which product markets are linked globally.
Trading barriers are of great importance to the result as they determine the
degree of openness of an economy and the type of firms active in equilib-
rium. With very high trading barriers horizontal multinational enterprises
are more likely to arise while exporting is relatively costly. In this section,
the unrestricted full-fledged model is simulated for different levels of trading
barriers t = {0.05, 0.15, 0.25, 0.35} to assess their influence on the model’s
main results.
Figure B.1 provides an overview of the effect of a one-sided minimum
wage in Europe on the unemployment rate. Consider first the cases of t =
{0.15, 0.25, 0.35}. The three curves coincide for a range of parameter values
at the lower and the upper bound of we. For low and high levels of the
minimum wage the active types of firms are the same irrespective of the level
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Figure B.2: Effect of a European Minimum Wage on American Wages for
Different Trading Costs
of trading barriers. Introducing only a moderate minimum wage will prevent
multinational enterprises from leaving the market while at very high levels
only national firms based in America can prevail (see Table B.1).
The effect of the level of trading barriers is evident from the intermediate
parameter range. With relative low barriers exporters will enter the market
already at relatively small values of we. Labour demand for the produc-
tion of the X good is transferred abroad and the unemployment rate rises
abruptly above the one calculated in simulations with higher trading barri-
ers. A comparably moderate minimum wage is sufficient to generate high
unemployment. With higher levels of trading costs the entry barriers for ex-
porting national firms are higher. Therefore, the ‘turning point’, at which the
fraction of X consumption produced abroad increases sharply, lies at higher
values of we. The range of parameters we consistent with multinational pro-
duction is extended while exporting firms arise only at higher values of we.
Hence, higher trading barriers reduce the adverse effects on unemployment
in Europe for intermediate values of we.
Figure B.2 provides the mirror image for the American labour market.
Again, the curves coincide for low and high levels of we. American wages are
increasing initially as multinational enterprises are relocating their headquar-
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we t = 0.05 t = 0.15 t = 0.25 t = 0.35
0.60
ne,na
me,ma me,ma me,ma
0.61
0.62
0.63
0.64
0.65
ma
ma
ma
0.66
0.67
0.68
0.69
ma,na
0.70
0.71
0.72
0.73
ma,na
0.74 me,ma,na
0.75
me,na
0.76
0.77
ma,na
0.78
0.79
0.80
0.81
0.82
na
0.83
0.84
na
0.85 me, na
0.86
na
0.87
0.88
0.89
0.90
Table B.1: Type(s) of Firms Active in Equilibrium for Different Trading
Costs
ters to America. A marked increase in wa can be observed once American
exporters start to produce a higher fraction for the European market. The
lower the level of trading barriers is the lower is the level of we that is suffi-
cient for the appearance of American-based exporting firms. Consequently,
the positive effect of implicit European minimum wages on wages in America
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is higher with lower trading barriers for some intermediate parameter range
of we.
The two figures also show that there is an interesting twist for t = 0.05.
Note first that for trading barriers of such small magnitude multinational
enterprises will never arise since exporting is almost costless. Moving from
t = 0.15 to t = 0.05 can then actually decrease unemployment in Europe in
the case of a very high wage floor. Intuitively, the very high unemployment
rate in Europe depresses income and market size. Worldwide consumption
of X is then strongly dominated by American demand. Very low trading
barriers enables exporters from Europe to access the American market and
European labour benefits since a fraction of American demand is met with
European production.
B.4 Additional Figures
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Appendix C
Unionisation Structures and
Heterogeneous Firms
C.1 Consumer Welfare in the Closed Econ-
omy Setting
In this subsection, I consider consumer welfare. The indirect utility function
associated with (4.1) is given by
U = IC + 12
(
η + γ
N
)−1
(α− p)2 + 12
N
γ
θ2p, (C.1)
where θ2p = (1/N)
∫
i∈Ω∗ (pi − p)2 di is the variance of prices. The utility of
the representative consumer depends on the price distribution, on product
variety and on total income. The first two determinants have been discussed
extensively in Section 4.4 and I now consider income.
Overall profits net of entry costs, i.e. gross profits of all surviving firms
minus the start up costs of all entrants, are zero. Wages are therefore the
only source of income in the model. The wage bill of the differentiated
product sector can be calculated by multiplying the average wage bill of a
single firm,W ρ =
[∫ cρmax
0 c
ρqρ(c)wρ(c)dG(c)
]
/G(cρmax), by the total number of
firms, Nρ. Units of labour not demanded by firms in the differentiated good
sector are employed in the numeraire sector and earn the competitive wage
rate of one. Labour income in the numeraire good sector thus equals total
labour supply minus the units of labour employed in the differentiated good
sector. The latter can be found by multiplying the average labour demand
of a single firm, Eρ =
[∫ cρmax
0 c
ρqρ(c)dG(c)
]
/G(cρmax), by the total number of
firms. Summarising the above, total income Iρ under labour market regime
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ρ = P,U,D is given by WBρNρ + (L− EρNρ). Rearranging gives
Iρ = L+
(
W
ρ
E
ρ − 1
)
E
ρ
Nρ. (C.2)
Equation (C.2) demonstrates that total income can be apportioned into
labour supply L, which equals the total wage bill in case all workers were
employed in the numeraire good sector, plus the rent earned by labour in
the differentiated good sector. The rent increases with the average wage dif-
ferential between the two sectors (W ρ/Eρ − 1) and with employment in the
differentiated product sector (EρNρ). With a perfectly competitive labour
market the inter-sectoral wage differential is zero and income just equals
L. With centralised bargaining the wage differential is θ − 1 and firm-level
bargaining elicits an average differential of (k + 1)/k − 1. Multiplying the
respective wage differential by the corresponding employment level and sub-
stituting into (C.2) yields:
IP = L, IU = L+ k(θ − 1)
θ
(α− pUmax)pUmax
η(k + 2) , I
D = L+ (α− p
D
max)pDmax
η(k + 2) .
(C.3)
Given the full employment assumption and the fact that bargaining raises
pay, labour income under both bargaining regimes exceeds income in the
flexible wage economy. The ordering of IU and ID is, however, ambiguous
and depends on the rent earned by labour under the the two bargaining
modes. Very low and very high values of θ cause the rent earned under
centralised bargaining to approach zero (and IU to fall below ID). Small
values of θ level the inter-sectoral wage differential, while very large values
marginalise employment in the differentiated good sector. For intermediate
levels of θ, however, labour income under centralised wage bargaining can
exceed income under firm-level bargaining. Consider exemplarily the case
of θk = 4 (and hence pUmax = pDmax).1 Income under centralised bargaining
is then larger (smaller) than income under firm-level bargaining for k > 2
(k < 2). While the wage differential is strictly larger under regime U at
θk = 4,2 more firms are active under regime D (cf. proposition 4ii.). Finally,
average labour demand per firm, E, is larger (smaller) under centralised
bargaining for k > 2 (k < 2).3
1More generally, IU is larger (smaller) than ID for k (θ − 1) (α− pUmax) > (<
)
(
4θ2
)1/(k+2) (
α− pDmax
)
.
241/k is strictly larger than (k + 1)/k for k ≥ 1.
3Calculating average labour demand explicitly gives EU =
(
k(pUmax)2
)
/ (2νθ) and
E
D =
(
k(pDmax)2
)
/ (4ν) with ν = γ(k + 1)(k + 2). For θk = 4 EU is larger than ED
provided that 41/k < 2.
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With endogenous income, utility under labour market regime ρ, Uρ, can
be written as:
UP = L+ 12η (α− p
P
max)
(
α− k + 1
k + 2p
P
max
)
, (C.4)
UU = L+ 12η (α− p
U
max)
(
α− 2k − θ(k − 1)
θ(k + 2) p
U
max
)
, (C.5)
UD = L+ 12η (α− p
D
max)
(
α− 2k − 12k + 4p
D
max
)
. (C.6)
For small values of θ centralised bargaining can actually result in higher
consumer welfare than a competitive labour market. To see this possibility,
notice that UP and UU converge as θ approaches the competitive wage rate
of one. It then remains to be shown that at θ = 1 utility under centralised
bargaining can be increasing in θ. Differentiating UU with respect to θ gives
∂UU
∂θ
= −Υ
[
2pUmax(2 + k(θ − 1)− θ) + α(3θ − 4)
]
, (C.7)
where Υ is strictly positive. The sign of (C.7) is indeed indeterminate for
1 ≤ θ < 4/3 (but strictly negative thereafter). It then follows that centralised
bargaining can in principle improve utility of the representative consumer by
increasing income and the variance of prices.
C.2 The Open Economy Setting with Sym-
metric Labour Market Regimes
In this subsection, I consider the two-country setting with symmetric labour
market regulations. Since the two trading partners Home and Foreign are
then identical, I drop the country superscript i = H,F . Instead, the super-
script ρ = P,U is used to distinguish between country pairs sharing a per-
fectly competitive labour market and a centralised wage bargaining regime,
respectively. Given the symmetry of the model, I shall only present equations
for Home. Analogous equations exist for Foreign as well.
Using (4.37) and (4.38), for each country pair ρ = P,U firm-level profits
(4.31) and (4.32) can be rewritten as
ΠPL(c) =
1
4γ
(
cPL − c
)2
, ΠPX(c) =
t2
4γ
(
cPX − c
)2
, (C.8)
ΠUL(c) =
θ2
4γ
(
cUL − c
)2
, ΠUX(c) =
t2θ2
4γ
(
cUX − c
)2
. (C.9)
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The corresponding free entry conditions are then given by:
(cPL)k+2 + t2(cPX)k+2 = 2γφ, (cUL)k+2 + t2(cUX)k+2 =
2γφ
θ2
, (C.10)
with φ ≡ (k + 1)(k + 2)(cM)kfE. Using cρX = cρL/t, these equations can
then be solved for the cost thresholds cρL and the corresponding upper price
bounds:
cPL = pPmax =
(
2γφ
1 + ρ
)1/(k+2)
, (C.11)
cUL =
pUmax
θ
=
( 1
θ2
)1/(k+2) ( 2γφ
1 + ρ
)1/(k+2)
. (C.12)
Inspecting these expressions shows that - analogous to the closed econ-
omy setting - the cut-off level cPL strictly exceeds cUL and the corresponding
price bound pPmax falls short of pUmax. With symmetric labour markets the
orderings of both the cost cut-offs and the upper price bounds established in
the closed economy model carry over to the open economy setting. Further-
more, without cross-country differences in the wage rate, trade liberalisation
just increases import competition and thus always induces tougher selection
among heterogeneous producers – independent of the specific labour market
regime.
C.3 Proof of Proposition 5
Proof. For a positive mass of entrants in Home, θ has to be smaller than t.
This also implies that θk − τ and 1 − τθk (with τ = 1/tk) are both positive
in sign. The elasticity of cHL with respect to τ is then positive (negative) for
θk > (<) (1 + τ 2)/2τ . The corresponding elasticity of Foreign is negative
for θk > 2τ/(τ + 1). This latter condition is always fulfilled for the relevant
parameter values t > θ > 1, 0 < τ < 1. Furthermore, differentiating the two
elasticities with respect to τ gives
∂
(
∂cHL
∂τ
τ
cHL
)
/∂τ = τ/
[
(k + 2)(1− τ 2)(θk − τ)2
]
> 0,
∂
(
∂cFL
∂τ
τ
cFL
)
/∂τ = τ(τ 2 − 1)/
[
(k + 2)(1− τ 2)(1− τθk)2
]
< 0,
where the respective signs directly follow from τ < 1.
Appendix D
The Impact of Offshoring on
Labour Market Dynamics in
Germany
D.1 Descriptive Statistics
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